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YOUR SECRET’S SAFE WITH ME . . . OR SO 
YOU THINK:  HOW THE STATES HAVE 
CASHED IN ON BRANZBURG’S “BLANK 
CHECK” 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Reporter’s shield laws are statutes that protect a newsgatherer from 
compulsory disclosure of confidential information.1  Since the 1970s, 
thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted reporter’s 
shield laws.2  During this wave of legislation, states adopted different 
types of reporter’s shield laws, each offering varying degrees of 
protection to journalists.3  This Note explores these assorted approaches 
and examines which type of privilege reporter’s shield laws should give 
to a newsgatherer to resist compulsory disclosure of his confidential 
sources and information.  Consider the following scenario.4 
It is three days before Christmas.  You come home from work and 
your two children greet you at the door.  You look at them and see the 
excitement of the approaching visit from Old Saint Nick.  Then, at that 
very moment, you feel your heart rate quicken and your eyes well up 
with tears.  This sickening feeling comes from the knowledge that in a 
few moments you will have to ruin your children’s Christmas.  You must 
tell them that you will not be able to spend the holidays with them this 
year because a federal judge has sentenced you to serve eighteen months 
in prison for refusing to disclose the identity of your confidential sources 
and information.5  Unfortunately, in 2006, this is how San Francisco 
                                                 
1 Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal 
Proceedings:  The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 446–47, 451–52 (2002/2003) 
(explaining that a journalist’s confidential information often includes the identity of 
confidential sources, the information gained from confidential sources, and the journalist’s 
own work product).  Further, the term “reporter’s privilege” is also known as a 
“journalist’s privilege,” a “reportorial privilege,” or a “newsmen’s privilege.”  Id. at 447 n.3. 
2 Anthony L. Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals:  What Congress Can Learn 
from the States, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 35, 46–49 (2006) (discussing shield laws at the state 
level and how they developed from the common law).  See infra note 31 (outlining the 
jurisdictions that have adopted reporter’s shield laws and recent developments at the state 
level). 
3 See generally Reporter’s Privilege, 919 PLI/Pat 9, 69–480 (Nov. 2007) (extensively 
detailing the extent of the split among state and federal jurisdictions as to the scope of 
protection of newsgatherers through either the common law or reporter’s shield laws). 
4 This anecdote was modified from Professor RonNell Andersen Jones’s law review 
article, Avalanche or Undue Alarm?  An Empirical Study of Subpoenas Received by the News 
Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 585 (2008). 
5 See Bob Egelko, Silence Means Prison, Judge Tells Reporters, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006, 
at A1 (detailing Fainaru-Wada’s ordeal and prison sentence).  See generally In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas, Fairanu-Wada &Williams, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113–14 (N.D. Cal. 2006).  
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Chronicle reporter Mark Fainaru-Wada and his family spent the holiday 
season.6 
The fate of Mark Fainaru-Wada is one he shares with countless other 
journalists.7  For centuries judges have held reporters in contempt and 
thrown them in jail for refusing to reveal confidential sources and 
information.8  The practice of jailing journalists for resisting compulsory 
disclosure is traceable to seventeenth century England and appeared in 
the American colonies as early as the 1700s.9  In the past three decades, 
however, the effort to protect newsgatherers from compulsory disclosure 
and incarceration has been the subject of legislative proposals and court 
decisions.10  Until now, protection for newsgatherers has been steady, 
but it has occurred only at the state level through the enactment of 
reporter’s shield laws by state legislatures.11  Reporter’s shield laws offer 
journalists a safe-haven and grant them a privilege to resist compliance 
with a subpoena or a court order requiring him to testify about his 
                                                                                                             
Mark Fainaru-Wada and his partner at the San Francisco Chronicle, Lance Williams, 
refused to comply with federal grand jury subpoenas ordering them to testify about 
information they had gained concerning the use of steroids by professional athletes.  Id.  
The Court denied Fainaru-Wada and Williams’s motion to quash the subpoenas because 
compliance with the subpoenas was not unreasonable and ordered them to testify before a 
grand jury.  See id. at 1121–22.  See also Joe Garofoli, 2 Chronicle Reporters at Center of Media, 
Government Standoff, S.F. CHRON., Sept 20, 2006, at A1. 
6 See Egelko, supra note 5, at A1. 
7 See Jones, supra note 4, at 626 (stating that in 2006, a national survey of 761 news and 
media organizations reported their newsgatherers had received over three thousand 
subpoenas). 
8 See 23 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE:  EVIDENCE § 5426 (2008). 
9 See, e.g., id. (discussing the practice of Seventeenth Century English courts pertaining 
to when a reporter refused to reveal confidential information to a judge on the King’s 
Bench and the typical result being a short period of incarceration).  See also Linda L. Berger, 
Shielding the Unmedia:  Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an 
Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1384 (2003) (discussing the jailing of 
reporters in post-revolutionary America, including Benjamin Franklin’s brother, James 
Franklin, and John Peter Zenger). 
10 See Laurence B. Alexander, Looking Out for the Watchdogs:  A Legislative Proposal 
Limiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of Protection for Sources 
and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 107–11 (2002) (giving an overview of the 
increased awareness and litigation concerning reporter’s shield laws since the early 1970s).  
For further discussion see infra Part II.A (outlining the history of reporter’s shield laws, 
how they have developed among the states, and the public policies supporting reporter’s 
shield laws). 
11 See 2 ANDREW B. ULMER, MEDIA, ADVERTISING, & ENTERTAINMENT LAW THROUGHOUT 
THE WORLD § 37:3 (Westlaw 2009), available on Westlaw at MEDIAWORLD § 37:3 (noting 
that the states, not the federal government, have been the catalyst for developing and 
reforming statutory schemes that safeguard journalists); Alexander, supra note 10, at 107–
11. 
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confidential sources and information.12  This Note focuses on the various 
types of privileges that state legislatures grant to newsgatherers through 
reporter’s shield laws and determines which privilege is the most 
effective.13 
To date, nearly forty jurisdictions in the United States have adopted 
reporter’s shield laws.14  None of these shield laws are the same, 
however, and states are not in agreement as to what type of privilege 
newsgatherers need to be able to best resist compulsory disclosure.15  
Nevertheless, each state’s privilege can be classified into one of four 
general categories:  (i) an absolute privilege; (ii) a qualified privilege; (iii) 
a blended privilege; or (iv) immunity from contempt.16  This Note 
addresses the various state approaches and proposes a resolution.17 
Part II of this Note explains the composition of a reporter’s shield 
law and discusses the root of the current state split:  the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.18  Further, Part II describes and 
illustrates the four types of privileges incorporated into reporter’s shield 
laws and examines the public policy considerations supporting each type 
of legislation.19  Next, Part III of this Note conducts a cost-benefit 
analysis of each of the four privileges to determine which privilege is the 
most effective.20  Finally, Part IV of this Note contributes “The 
                                                 
12 See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 526 (2004) (explaining what a reporter’s shield law is 
and how it functions as a device to guard against compulsory disclosure). 
13 See infra Parts II–III (giving background information on reporter’s shield laws and the 
types of privileges incorporated into reporter’s shield laws and conducting a cost-benefit 
analysis to ascertain which of these privileges is the most practical and effective). 
14 See Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals:  What Congress Can Learn from the 
States, supra note 2, at 46–49.  See also infra note 31 (listing the states that have enacted a 
reporter’s shield law and giving the citations to the corresponding state statutes). 
15 See Laurence B. Alexander & Ellen M. Bush, Shield Laws on Trial:  State Court 
Interpretation of the Journalist’s Statutory Privilege, 23 J. LEGIS. 215, 216–18 (1997).  See infra 
Part II.C (examining the split among the states in further detail). 
16 See Anthony L. Fargo & Paul McAdoo, Common Law or Shield Law?  How Rule 501 
Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1347, 1355–65 (2007) 
(explaining the privileges adopted by reporter’s shield laws and the privileges the state and 
federal judicial systems have developed through the common law).  See infra Part II.C 
(defining the privileges and illustrating how they apply). 
17 See infra Parts II–IV (discussing reporter’s shield laws and the different privileges 
incorporated by the states, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the privileges, and 
proposing a model statute to resolve the state split). 
18 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  See infra Parts II.A–B (defining what a reporter’s shield law is, 
examining the policies that justify reporter’s shield laws, and discussing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Branzburg). 
19 See infra Part II.C (discussing the differences between each privilege and using the 
reporter’s shield laws of Indiana, Florida, Illinois, New York, the District of Columbia, and 
California to illustrate the application of each privilege). 
20 See infra Part III (examining the costs and benefits of the application of each privilege, 
the interests of the parties concerned, and the public policies underlying each privilege). 
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Newsgatherer’s Protection Act,” which is a model reporter’s shield law 
that incorporates what the cost-benefit analysis determines is the most 
practical privilege:  the blended privilege.21 
II.  BACKGROUND:  THE NUISANCE OF CHOICE  
The state split this Note addresses is the product of a single catalyst:  
unfettered choice.22  Part II of this Note offers an introduction to state 
reporter’s shield laws and explains what reporter’s shield laws are, traces 
their development, and explores the purposes and policies they serve.23  
Next, Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg and 
identifies this decision as the source of the current state split.24  Finally, 
Part II addresses the problem at the state level and provides examples of 
the privileges that state shield laws grant to reporters to resist 
compulsory disclosure.25 
A. State Reporter’s Shield Laws:  An Introduction 
First, this Section answers the question, “What is a reporter’s shield 
law?”26  Next, it describes the underlying purposes and policy 
considerations of state shield laws.27  Additionally, this Section addresses 
why shield laws are needed to protect newsgatherers.28 
Reporter’s shield laws protect members of the media by granting 
newsgatherers a privilege to refuse to reveal confidential sources and 
                                                 
21 See infra Part IV (offering a model statute with full commentary to resolve the state 
split as to which privilege is the most effective and practical). 
22 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (stating that the states are free to enact any kind of law 
granting journalists a privilege to resist compulsory disclosure, so long as the law falls 
within the limits of the Constitution).  See also Part II.B (explaining that the Branzburg 
decision is the root of the state split addressed by this Note). 
23 See infra Part II.A (discussing the development of state reporter’s shield laws, how and 
why they operate, and the controversy they spark). 
24 See infra Part II.B (reviewing the holding, opinions, and reasoning of the Court, and 
outlining the principles of the decision). 
25  See infra Part II.C (summarizing where the states agree with respect to reporter’s 
shield laws and then charting the various privileges incorporated by the states using as 
models the shield laws of Indiana, Florida, Illinois, New York, California, and the District 
of Columbia). 
26 See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (explaining that a reporter’s shield law is 
a statutory privilege granted to newsgatherers to refuse to comply with court orders or 
subpoenas to testify about or reveal confidential sources or information). 
27 See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (focusing on the policy rationales and 
underlying purposes of reporter’s shield laws). 
28 See infra, notes 36–40 and accompanying text (discussing the need for reporter’s shield 
laws due to the tension that exists between the press, sources of information, litigants, the 
government, law enforcement, and the courts). 
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information when subpoenaed or ordered by a court to do so.29  There is 
no uniformly accepted privilege at the state level; rather, states have 
implemented a variety of privileges that come in one of four generic 
forms:  (i) an absolute privilege; (ii) a qualified privilege; (iii) a blended 
privilege that combines the absolute and qualified privileges; or (iv) 
immunity from contempt for noncompliance with a court order or 
subpoena.30  Currently, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia 
have enacted reporter’s shield laws and several more have recently 
proposed legislation.31 
                                                 
29 See 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 526 (2004) (giving a brief definition of what a reporter’s 
shield law is and the effect shield laws have on journalists); ULMER, supra note 11, at § 37:3 
(defining reporter’s shield laws and the common law reporter’s privilege and comparing 
the two). 
30 See Noah Goldstein, An International Assessment of Journalist Privileges and Source 
Confidentiality, 14 NEW ENG. INT’L COMP. L. ANN. 103, 110 (2007) (“the various state statutes 
range in scope, from broad protections that provide an absolute journalistic privilege, to 
shield laws that offer a qualified privilege,” to those that offer everything in between).  See 
also infra Part II.C (exploring the four generic types of privileges that the states grant 
members of the media to be free from compelled disclosure). 
31 See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (1992); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982) & ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214 (1993); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-85-510 (West 1987); CAL. CONST. ART. 1, § 2 (1993); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 
1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-119 & 
COLO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-72.5-101 to 24-72.5-106 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146T 
(2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1992); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701–16-4704 (1992); 
FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (West 1993); 2008 HAW. SESS. LAWS ch. 
240 § 1 (effective July 2, 2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (West 1985); IND. CODE § 34-46-
4-1, 34-46-4-2 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 45:1451–45:1459 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 1992); ME. 
PUB. L. CH. 654, signed into law on April 18, 2008; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5A (1982); MINN. 
STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901–26-1-903 (1992); NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 20-144–20-147 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.275–49.385 (1986); N.J. REV. STAT. 
§§ 2A:84A-21–2A:84A-21.13 (1996); N.M. STAT. § 38-6-7 (1987);  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H  
(McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1991); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04 & 2739.11–2739.12 (West 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 
(1996); OR. REV. STAT., §§ 44.510–44.540 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (1993); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 24-1-208 (1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2007). 
 The states that have enacted reporter’s shield laws are:  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, The District of Columbia, Florida, 
Hawaii, Georgia, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Maine, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Washington.  For a breakdown of the privileges to which the states 
adhere see infra notes 67–70.  In addition, several states without reporter’s shield laws have 
recently considered legislation to enact a shield law.  Several states have bills before their 
legislatures, including Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See 
S.R. 211, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 1672, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2008); H.R. 1539, 2008 
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 2735, 2008 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2008); S.R. 235, 2008 Reg. Sess. 
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Reporter’s shield laws address several public policy concerns.32  
First, reporter’s shield laws facilitate the free flow of information to the 
public and promote freedom of the press.33  Next, shield laws aid law 
enforcement and litigants where necessary, and prevent the disclosure of 
information that is contrary to the public interest.34  Moreover, shield 
laws prevent “fishing expeditions” by litigants and government officials 
                                                                                                             
(Wis. 2008).  Also, a bill proposing a shield law was actually passed by the Texas State 
Senate before being rejected by the State House of Representatives.  See S.B. 966, 2008 Reg. 
Sess. (Tex. 2008).  Finally, Utah’s Supreme Court recently handed down a model 
evidentiary rule that would create a shield law.  See UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 509, 
PROPOSED (2008).  See also Media Law Resource Center, Proposed State Shield Law Bills, 
http://www.medialaw.org/Template.cfm?Section=Proposed_State_Shield_Law_Bills (last 
visited August 3, 2009). 
32 Susan M. Gilles, The Image of “Good Journalism” in Privilege, Tort Law, and Constitutional 
Law, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 485, 486–90 (2006).  Curiously, however, nearly all reporter’s 
shield laws are silent as to any kind of legislative intent or purpose.  Id. at 487 n.12 (citing 
Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals:  What Congress Can Learn from the States, supra 
note 2, at 69–70).  In fact, the only legislatures to include a statement of legislative purpose 
in their reporter’s shield law are Minnesota and Nebraska.  Id. 
33 See Joel G. Weinberg, Supporting the First Amendment:  A National Reporter’s Shield Law, 
31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 175 (2006) (noting that enacting a shield law serves two 
purposes:  assuring the free flow of information to the public and that journalists are free to 
report that information, and preventing disclosure of confidential information that is not in 
the public’s best interest); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s 
Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 535 (2007) (explaining the purpose of shield laws is to 
preserve the dissemination of information into the public discourse); Anthony L. Fargo, The 
Year of Leaking Dangerously:  Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the 
Federal Journalist’s Privilege, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1063, 1072–73 (2006) (same); Leslye 
DeRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Case for a Federal Journalist’s Testimonial Shield 
Statute, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 779, 781 (1991) (the primary objective of a shield law is to 
strengthen a reporter’s First Amendment rights). 
34 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696–97, 700 (1972) (discussing the 
important need for law enforcement officers to have access to all available information 
related to crimes or criminal investigations); Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 451–52 
(explaining that shield laws serve to prevent the so-called “chilling effect,” which refers to 
the theory that if source confidentiality was not protected then confidential sources would 
be reluctant to give information to journalists; hence, the newsgathering process and the 
dissemination of information would be “chilled”); Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and 
Fourth Estate Inmates:  The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L. J. 385, 428–37 (2006) (suggesting that certain journalists who operate independently 
and are not connected with an official news or media organization often are able to obtain 
sensitive information relating to criminal investigations and national security); John T. 
White, Comment, Smoke Screen:  Are State Shield Laws Really Protecting Speech or Simply 
Providing Cover for Criminals Like the Serial Arsonist?, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 909, 911–12 (2001) 
(describing how reporter’s shield laws aid, but also hinder police investigations).  But see 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693–94 (downplaying the plausibility of the “chilling effect” as being 
too speculative because only twenty percent of reporters who relied on confidential sources 
forecasted any kind of possible adverse effect if their sources were to be disclosed).  For an 
analysis of the chilling effect and how it influences the type of privilege a state adopts, see 
infra Part III. 
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who attempt to obtain a journalist’s confidential information for their 
own use, which allows a reporter’s communications and relationships 
with their sources to remain privileged and confidential.35 
Generally, the objectives of the media and the newsgathering 
community are to gather information and to relay that information to the 
public.36  To accomplish these goals, journalists must often use 
confidential sources—sources of information that have a confidentiality 
agreement with a reporter—because these sources have access to 
sensitive facts and materials.37  Further, information gained from a 
                                                 
35 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (recognizing the threat 
fishing expeditions pose to a journalist’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of sources 
and information).  See also Edward L. Carter, Note, Reporter’s Privilege in Utah, 18 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 163, 183 (2003) (citing Theodore J. Boutrous & Seth M.M. Stodder, Retooling the 
Federal Common-Law Reporter’s Privilege, 17 COMM. LAW. 1, 23 (Spring 1999)) (stating that a 
reporter’s shield law eliminates unnecessary subpoenas served upon newsgatherers by 
litigants that are on fishing expeditions); Sharon K. Malheiro, Note, The Journalist’s 
Reportorial Privilege—What Does it Protect and What are its Limits?, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 79, 90–
91 (1988/1989) (citing Grand Forks Herald v. District Court, 322 N.W.2d 850, 856 (N.D. 
1982)) (arguing that the protections of a shield law should prevail over fishing expeditions 
into a journalist’s files); Shelley R. Halber, Note, Knight-Ridder Broadcasting v. Greenberg: 
is the Judiciary Making Policy?, 8 PACE L. REV. 427, 455–56 n.169 (citing People v. Iannaccone, 
447 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)) (clarifying that the clear language of New York’s 
shield law indicated the legislature intended to prevent fishing expeditions); Developments 
in the Law:  Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1601 (1985) (stating that 
compulsory disclosure inhibits confidential communications between journalists and their 
sources).  See also MAURICE VAN GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS:  THE 
CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW VERSUS THE LAW’S RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIAL NEWS SOURCE 
EVIDENCE 58–103 (1979) (arguing that a reporter’s privilege is similar to other privileges, 
such as the attorney/client, pastor/parishioner, and doctor/patient, but operates in a 
different manner because the information is usually known but the source’s identity is not). 
36 Robert T. Sherwin, Comment, “Source” of Protection:  The Status of the Reporter’s 
Privilege in Texas and a Call to Arms for the State’s Legislators and Journalists, 32 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 137, 139 (2000).  In disseminating information to readers or viewers, the media 
presents the information in the form of what is more commonly known as a “story.”  Id.  
See Richard Rosen, Comment, A Call for Legislative Response to New York’s Narrow 
Interpretation of the Newsperson’s Privilege:  Knight-Ridder Broadcasting Inc. v. Greenberg, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 285, 285 (1988).  Typically, in an effort to present the most accurate 
information to the public at large, newsgatherers tend to accumulate a surplus of 
information, the bulk of which is never used in the actual story.  Id. 
37 Alexander, supra note 10, at 102.  Confidential sources have facilitated newsgathering 
in several ways:  (i) they help journalists acquire information that is otherwise inaccessible; 
(ii) they cultivate sources by burrowing deeper than reporters are able to; (iii) they build 
trust; and, (iv) they give confidence and protection to apprehensive sources.  Id.  See 
William E. Lee, Deep Background:  Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1453, 1462–64 (2008).  In the context of national and international news, confidential 
sources tend to be current and former high-level government agency officials and members 
of the President’s administration.  See id.; John D. Castiglione, A Structuralist Critique of the 
Journalist’s Privilege, 23 J. L. & POL. 115, 137–39 (2007); Louis J. Capocasale, Comment, Using 
the Shield as a Sword:  An Analysis of How the Current Congressional Proposals for a Reporter’s 
Shield Law Wound the Fifth Amendment, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 339, 349 n.47 
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confidential source, including the source’s identity, is valuable in many 
legal proceedings or investigations.38  Thus, the interests of third parties, 
such as a criminal defendant, a civil litigant, or the government, compete 
with the media’s interest in maintaining confidentiality.39  This creates a 
natural tension between journalists, litigants, and the government, which 
is usually broken by the issuance of a subpoena or court order requiring 
a journalist to testify about his confidential sources or confidential 
information.40  Such a scenario places the journalist in a difficult position 
where he must weigh the legal ramifications of refusing to testify against 
the ethical consequences of testifying and disclosing a source or 
confidential information.41  This problem has caused the media to turn to 
                                                                                                             
(2006) (citing Olga Puerto, When Reporters Break Their Promises to Sources:  Towards a 
Workable Standard in Confidential Source/Breach of Contract Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 501, 512 
(1992)) (same). 
38 See generally Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1341, 1350–54 (2008) (noting the value that a journalist’s confidential information 
could have to a party during criminal and civil litigation). 
39 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (stressing that grand juries must be able to hear every 
man’s evidence and should have the right to subpoena any and all witnesses); Watkins v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957) (concluding that Congress has the power to require 
compulsory disclosure of any information that falls within its legislative sphere); 
Papandrea, supra note 33, at 541–42 (suggesting that shield laws aid and hinder law 
enforcement’s efforts to prevent crime); Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege, 
supra note 38, at 1350–54 (discussing the practice of prosecutors and litigants to subpoena 
journalists to gain access to information pertaining to a case); Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and 
Fourth Estate Inmates, supra note 34, at 444–45 (stating that in cases concerning the reporter’s 
privilege criminal defendants and litigants have the right to confront the evidence against 
them). 
40 See generally Alexander & Bush, supra note 15, at 219–24 (describing that subpoenas 
are the way in which most litigants or government officials attempt to access a reporter’s 
confidential information and conducting a study of which type of sources and information 
were more likely to be the target of a subpoena).  Timothy L. Alger, Comment, Promises Not 
to be Kept:  The Illusory Newsgatherer’s Privilege in California, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 155, 167 
(1991).  Aside from the journalist’s testimony, the targets of these subpoenas and court 
orders are the documents, notes, films, tapes, and other discovery materials that the 
reporter has compiled and organized from the source.  Id.  This secondary evidence, which 
is usually the reporter’s own work product and thought-process, can be invaluable and 
highly credible because of a journalist’s tendency to take copious “notes and 
photographs . . . to seek out controversies, and their independence of the disputing parties” 
which also “makes journalists attractive and particularly credible witnesses.”  Id. 
41 See Alger, supra note 40, at 166–67.  With respect to legal punishment, the news 
organizations are generally subject to civil penalties for those reporters they employ; 
however, “[f]or uncooperative reporters . . . the courts favor imprisonment.”  Id. at 166.  
The most common punishment for a noncompliant reporter is being cited for contempt, 
which can lead to jail time or monetary fines.  Id. at 166–67.  See also David G. Savage, Ex-
Reporter Told to Reveal Sources or Pay Daily Fines, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at 8, available at 
2008 WLNR 4748486.  An example of such a fine occurred in March 2008 when, in response 
to a former USA Today reporter’s refusal to disclose her sources, a court ordered the 
payment of a fine starting out at five hundred dollars per day for one week, then rising to 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/6
2009] Your Secret’s Safe With Me 191 
state legislatures and ask that the legislatures grant a reporter’s privilege 
via the enactment of a state reporter’s shield law.42 
                                                                                                             
one thousand dollars per day the next week, and finally capping out at five thousand 
dollars per day until she complied with her subpoena.  Id.  Additionally, the court barred 
her former publisher, family, friends, or any anonymous supporters from paying her fines.  
Id. 
 A journalist’s predicament as to revealing his confidential sources is compounded by 
the sacred tenet of journalism to protect one’s source.  Alger, supra note 40, at 169 n.78 
(quoting DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 358 
(5th ed. 1990)).  Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously:  Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, 
and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1068.  “There is a 
long history of journalists claiming they should not have to reveal the identities of their 
sources for news stories.”  Id.  Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press:  First Amendment 
Limitations on News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN L. REV. 
1553, 1565 n.64 (1989) (citing AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD, CODE OF ETHICS (1934)).  This 
history can be traced to when the American Newspaper Guild (A.N.G.) adopted and 
published its Code of Ethics in 1934.  Id.  Specifically, the A.N.G. adopted a canon in its 
Code of Ethics which provided that “[n]ewspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or 
disclose sources of confidential information in court or before judicial or investigating 
bodies.”  Id.  See also Joseph W. Ragusa, Comment, Biting the Hand That Feeds You:  The 
Reporter-Confidential Source Relationship in the Wake of Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 67 
ST. JOHNS L. REV. 125, 142 n.85 (1993) (citing Dicke, supra, at 1565 n.64) (stressing the 
significance in the journalistic profession of protecting sources and information from 
discovery). 
42 See Elizabeth A. Graham, Comment, Uncertainty Leads to Jail Time:  The Status of the 
Common-Law Reporter’s Privilege, 56 DEPAUL L. REV 723, 751–52 (2007) (noting the 
importance that state legislatures have played in the development of reporter’s shield 
laws).  ULMER, supra note 11, at § 37:3.  The press is resorting to state legislatures because 
the federal government has been unable to pass legislation creating protection for reporters 
in this regard, and the federal courts lack consensus on whether a reporter’s privilege exists 
under the First Amendment.  Id.  See  WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 8, at § 5426.  
Reporter’s shield laws codify the common law reporter’s privilege, which has its origins in 
English common law.  See id. (noting that in Eighteenth Century England a journalist’s 
refusal to reveal confidential information often resulted in an ineffectual short-term jailing, 
which yielded, in effect, a de facto reporter’s privilege because journalists could keep the 
confidentiality of their sources if they were willing to spend a few days in jail). 
See Paul Allee Curtis, Comment, New Limits on Freedom of the Press:  Newsperson’s 
Qualified Privilege Fails to Protect Nonconfidential Videotape Outtakes—State v. Salisbury,  34 
IDAHO L. REV. 191, 194–95 n.21 (1997).  Also, the theory of a reporter’s privilege has been 
found under the First Amendment to the federal constitution, albeit not by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, state constitutions, and the common law.  Id.; Sherwin, supra note 36, at 
149.  But see, Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667 (declaring that there is no reporter’s privilege under 
the Constitution or at the common law).  Nevertheless, several federal circuits do recognize 
a reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment.  See Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Burke, 700 
F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126; Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th 
Cir. 1978), opinion supplemented, reh’g denied, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S 
1041 (1981); United States v. Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).  See also 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2008).  Furthermore, 
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The competing interests involved in the creation of shield laws have 
fueled a deep-seated rift at the state level.43  Although the controversy 
lies at the state level, its origin is found in the federal system with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg.44 
                                                                                                             
regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice also give credence to the notion of a 
qualified reporter’s privilege.  Id. (establishing requirements for when a newsgatherer can 
be compelled to testify).  Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 478–79.  Another persuasive 
argument for finding some form of a reporter’s privilege is found under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, specifically Rule 501 which pertains to privileges based on state law.  Id.  For 
compelling discussions and arguments advocating Supreme Court recognition of a 
reporter’s privilege via Rule 501 see Fargo & McAdoo, Common Law or Shield Law?  How 
Rule 501 Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem,, supra note 16; Graham, supra, at 725–
27; Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession:  The Case for Supreme Court 
Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201, 250–55 (2005). 
Weinberg, supra note 33, at 174–75.  Furthermore, fourteen states have recognized a 
common law reporter’s privilege under either the United States Constitution or their 
corresponding state constitution.  Id.  Wyoming is the only state that has not adopted a 
common law reporter’s privilege or a shield law.  Id.  See also William E. Lee, The Priestly 
Class:  Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 651 n.80 (2006) 
(explaining the same).  The state courts that have adopted a common law reporter’s 
privilege and the leading cases from those states are as follows:  Idaho,  In re Contempt of 
Wright, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985); Iowa, Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 
1987); Kansas, State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812 (Kan. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); 
Massachusetts, In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1991); 
Mississippi, Pierce v. The Clarion Ledger, 433 F. Supp. 2d 754 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Missouri, 
Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); New Hampshire, New 
Hampshire v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499 (N.H. 1982); South Dakota, Hopewell v. Midcontinent 
Broadcasting Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780 (S.D. 1995); Texas, Channel Two Television Co. v. 
Dickerson, 725 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Vermont, State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 
(Vt. 1974); Virginia, Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974); West Virginia, 
State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1989); Wisconsin, Zelenka v. State, 266 
N.W.2d 279 (Wis. 1978). 
43 See Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States 
Without Shield Laws, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 257–58 (2002) (the journalist’s privilege has 
developed in an ad hoc manner in state jurisdictions, thus sparking widespread 
disagreement about protection for nonconfidential sources and information); Graham, 
supra note 42, at 751 (“State shield laws provide various levels of protection for 
reporters . . . . [F]rom near-complete protection to protection only in very specific 
situations.”). 
44  See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (stating that the federal constitution does not 
include a common law reporter’s privilege, but the states are free to enact legislation that 
gives protection to journalists).  See also David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 429, 487 (2002) (explaining how the confusion at the federal level quickly transcended 
to the states).  For a summary of Branzburg’s effect on the actions of state legislatures and 
the reporter’s shield laws they have enacted, see infra Part II.B (explaining the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Branzburg and how its “blank check” to the states has created the state-
split that is the focus of this Note). 
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B. A Beautiful Disaster 
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a 
privilege existed under the First Amendment that exempted a reporter 
from being compelled to testify about or disclose confidential sources 
and information to grand juries.45  In Branzburg, reporters were 
subpoenaed to testify about articles based on information gained from 
confidential sources.46  In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that no 
common law reporter’s privilege existed under the First Amendment, 
and journalists could not refuse to testify before a state or federal grand 
jury.47  Justice White’s majority opinion rejected the claim that the 
decision would have a “chilling effect” on the gathering and reporting of 
news because the argument was “widely divergent and to a great extent 
speculative.”48  Therefore, the majority concluded that newsgatherers did 
                                                 
45 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.  The Branzburg decision consolidated four separate cases, 
each of which involved newspaper and television reporters who had been subpoenaed to 
testify before state or federal grand juries about stories they had written pertaining to 
illegal drug usage and subversive political groups.  Id. at 667–79.  Justice White delivered 
the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and 
Justice Rehnquist.  Id. at 667.  Also, Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion and Justices 
Douglas and Stewart dissented.  Id. at 709, 711, 725.  Justice Stewart’s dissent was joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall.  Id. at 725. 
46 Id. at 667–79.  In each of the cases, the lower courts denied the journalists’ motions to 
quash the subpoenas.  See id.  The Kentucky and Massachusetts state courts concluded that 
a reporter did not have a common law privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury.  See 
Id.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did recognize that a reporter could keep 
their source’s confidentiality if the government was unable to show a compelling need.  Id. 
at 679. 
47 Id. at 667.  Even though Justice White conceded that newsgatherers were entitled to 
some constitutional protection, he emphasized that a journalist’s duty to comply with a 
grand jury subpoena was no different than that of any other citizen.  Id. at 702–03.  Justice 
White adamantly announced that “without some protection for seeking out the news, 
freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”  Id. at 681.  Justice White explained, however, 
that absent prior restraints or restrictions on the press’s speech, a simple grand jury 
subpoena did not amount to an infringement of free speech or press.  Id.  Further 
substantiating his conclusion, Justice White looked to the historical significance of the 
grand jury, as well as the indispensable tasks which it performs, and emphasized that “[a]t 
common law, courts consistently refused to recognize the existence of any privilege 
authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information to a grand jury.”  Id. at 
685.  The rationale, in Justice White’s eyes, was that the grand jury required that “every 
man’s evidence” be heard.  Id. at 687.  Moreover, Justice White voiced the important public 
policy interests in efficient grand jury proceedings and successful law enforcement 
investigations and opined that the secrecy surrounding a grand jury’s work would provide 
sufficient protection for a reporter’s confidential sources and information.  Id. at 687–88.  
See also infra note 50 (explaining that due to the somewhat ambiguous wording of Justice 
Powell’s concurrence, several of the federal circuits have concluded that Branzburg was a 
plurality). 
48 Id. at 693–94.  Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 451–53.  The “chilling effect” is an 
extremely important concern, however, because news organizations rely heavily on 
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not have a privilege to resist compelled disclosure of confidential sources 
and information in the context of a grand jury subpoena.49 
Justice Powell filed an “enigmatic” concurrence which limited the 
majority’s holding.50  Justice Powell highlighted that journalists were not 
                                                                                                             
confidential sources.  Id.  For instance, in a recent study, the Wall Street Journal determined 
that around fifteen percent of its articles in the 1970s were based on confidential 
information.  Id. at 453.  See Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously:  Shadowy Sources, Jailed 
Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1073.  
This chilling effect could have dire ramifications for the public because the free flow of 
information creates an educated and well-informed citizenry that supports our elected 
officials in their decision-making process.  Id. at 1073 (citing generally ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).  James Thomas 
Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, Enacting a Reasonable Federal Shield Law:  A Reply to Professors 
Clymer and Eliason, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1326 (2008).  Confidential sources are essential to 
the workings of our Republic, for without them the news media would be “reduced to 
simply regurgitating official versions of news events, versions that may be incomplete or 
inadequate.”  Id. 
49 Branzburg, 405 U.S. at 702–04.  In addition, at the conclusion of his opinion, Justice 
White wrote the states a “blank check” when he observed that state legislatures were “free, 
within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions 
and problems with respect to the relations between law enforcement officials and press.”  
Id. at 706.  Thus, the Court was “powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own 
way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman’s privilege, 
either qualified or absolute.”  Id. 
50 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  See Rodney A. Smolla, The First Amendment, 
Journalists, and Sources:  A Curious Study in “Reverse Federalism,” 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1423, 
1426 (2008).  Justice Powell’s concurrence has become the centerpiece of controversy and 
uncertainty swirling around the Court’s decision in Branzburg and has been characterized 
as ambiguous, opaque, cryptic, and a model of muddle.  Id.  See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–
10 (Powell, J., concurring).  Though Justice Powell’s concurrence was brief, composed of 
just two paragraphs and a footnote, it placed a substantial limitation on the holding of the 
majority.  See id.; Laura Durity, Note, Shielding Journalist-“Bloggers”:  The Need to Protect 
Newsgathering Despite the Distributing Medium,  2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11, 14 n.35 
(citing Adam Liptak, The Hidden Federal Shield Law:  On the Justice Department’s Regulations 
Governing Subpoenas to the Press, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227, 231).  Moreover, the 
limitation was so severe that the practical effect of Justice Powell’s concurrence has been to 
erode Branzburg’s five-to-four majority decision into a four-one-four plurality.  Id.; Rodney 
A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1097, 1102 n.18 (1999) (judging Branzburg to be a four-one-four plurality).  See In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  Hence, numerous 
federal circuits have seized upon this limiting language and used it to interpret Branzburg 
as a plurality, thus allowing for the finding of a reporter’s privilege under the First 
Amendment or the common law.  Id.  The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged that several 
federal circuits interpret Branzburg as a plurality and hence recognize a reporter’s privilege 
under the First Amendment.  Id.  See also Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(finding Branzburg to be a plurality and employing Justice Powell’s concurrence to find a 
common law reporter’s privilege under the First Amendment); United States v. Caporale, 
806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983) (same); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 663 F.2d 
583 (1st Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (same); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 
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without constitutional rights to gather news and protect their sources.51  
Further, Justice Powell made it explicitly clear that the appropriate 
protection for newsgatherers was not  a shield law, but was a motion to 
quash the grand jury’s subpoena or  a motion for a protective order.52  In 
contrast, Justice Douglas dissented and vigorously advocated for an 
absolute privilege that allowed journalists to keep the confidentiality of 
their sources and information indefinitely.53  Justice Stewart dissented as 
well and argued the majority’s holding would annex the media as an 
investigative arm of government, which chilled the dissemination of 
information to the public.54  Hence, Justice Stewart determined that a 
                                                                                                             
1978), opinion supplemented, reh’g denied, 628 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1041 (1981) (same); United States v. Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (same). 
51 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice Powell stressed that a 
grand jury’s good faith operation requires that the relationship between a reporter’s 
information and the grand jury’s own investigation must not be too remote and tenuous.  
Id. at 710. 
52 Id.  The main reason Justice Powell opposed the recognition of any kind of privilege, 
particularly a qualified privilege, was because it would necessitate the creation and 
implementation of a balancing test.  Id.  Justice Powell argued the interests of the 
newsgatherer could be properly judged and balanced in the context of a motion to quash or 
requesting a protective order.  Id.  As he explained, any claimed privilege “should be 
judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the 
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  See Paul Marcus, The Reporter’s Privilege:  An Analysis of the Common 
Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 837–39 
(1984).  The glaring flaw in Justice Powell’s concurrence, and undoubtedly the source of the 
current circuit split at the federal level, was that Justice Powell’s usage of the terms “proper 
balance” and “balance” implies a balancing test, and thus something along the lines of a 
qualified privilege was appropriate under certain factual conditions.  Id. 
53 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  A qualified privilege, in Justice 
Douglas’ eyes, was not necessary because “all of the ‘balancing’ was done by those who 
wrote the Bill of Rights.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Justice Douglas reasoned that the First 
Amendment affords people an absolute freedom to their opinions, beliefs, and to the 
information they generate in the course of testing their opinions and beliefs.  Id. at 714–15.  
Thus, the majority’s decision would “have two retarding effects upon the ear and the pen 
of the press.  Fear of exposure will cause dissidents to communicate less openly to trusted 
reporters.  And, fear of accountability will cause editors and critics to write with more 
restrained pens.”  Id. at 721.  As such, the public’s right to know and the free flow of 
information would be rendered nonexistent.  See id.  Furthermore, Justice Douglas relied 
heavily on conclusion that “[t]he First and Tenth Amendments protect the governing 
‘powers’ of the people from abridgment by the agencies which are established as their 
servants.”  Id. at 714 (quoting Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 254 (1961)) (emphasis omitted). 
54 Id. at 725.  Justice Stewart argued that these concerns effectuated a constitutional right 
for a reporter to protect his sources and forced disclosure could only be enforced if there 
was a compelling interest at stake.  See id.  Justice Stewart believed that if newsgatherers 
had no protection the media’s role as a watchdog would be severely curtailed.  Id. at 727.  
Further, Justice Stewart emphasized the necessity of confidential sources to maintain the 
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qualified privilege was needed to balance the interests of the reporter 
with those of third parties in order to bring about the most judicious and 
equitable result.55 
There is much confusion and difficulty regarding precisely what 
Branzburg means.56  First, Justice Douglas was the only Justice who 
supported the recognition of an absolute reporter’s privilege under the 
First Amendment.57  Also, Justice Powell and the four dissenting Justices 
agreed that newsgatherers were entitled to some measure of protection 
from compulsory disclosure.58  Three justices, and possibly Justice 
Powell, approved of a qualified privilege that would balance the 
interests of the parties concerned when a court determines whether to 
compel disclosure of a journalist’s confidential sources or information.59  
                                                                                                             
effectiveness of the newsgathering process.  See id. at 726–29.  In support of his cause, 
Justice Stewart pointed out that although the grand jury played an important role in the 
administration of justice, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments already limited the power of 
the grand jury, so an additional limitation to maintain the free flow of information under 
the First Amendment was practical and logical.  Id. at 737. 
55 See id. at 736–44.  To balance these interests, Justice Stewart explained and proposed a 
balance test that required the government to demonstrate:  (1) probable cause the reporter 
has information that is relevant to a probable violation of law; (2) the information sought 
cannot be obtained through any alternative means; and, (3) the defendant has a compelling 
and overriding interest in accessing the information.  Id. at 743. 
56 Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Déjà vu All Over Again:  How a Generation of Gains in 
Federal Reporter’s Privilege Law is Being Reversed, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 13, 20–21 
(2006).  See Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 469–70.  There are three generally recognized 
exceptions to Branzburg:  civil litigation, the Sixth Amendment, and reporters who witness 
the crime.  Id. 
57 See Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 48, at 1301.  Also, “[a]ll nine Justices agreed that 
journalists were protected from bad faith grand jury investigations,” yet the majority failed 
to specify what circumstances rendered a grand jury’s actions to be in bad faith.  Id.  On a 
different note, no federal circuit has sided with Justice Douglas’ opinion and recognized an 
absolute privilege.  Id. at 1304.  Several state supreme courts, on the other hand, have 
followed Justice Douglas’ reasoning and established an absolute privilege under the federal 
constitution, their corresponding state constitution, or the common law.  See id. at 1302–03. 
58 See Michele Bush Kimball, The Intent Behind the Cryptic Concurrence That Provided a 
Reporter’s Privilege, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 379, 380 (2008) (describing the decision not as a 
five to four majority, but as a four-and-a-half to four-and-a-half plurality, due to the 
wording of Justice Powell’s concurrence). 
59 See id. at 379–81.  Justice Powell’s concurrence has been interpreted as creating a 
plurality by the federal courts and also as advocating the use of some kind of balancing test 
because of the repeated use of the word “balance” and the phrase “case-by-case basis” in 
his opinion.  Id. at 393–94.  Justice Powell, however, never provided a specific test; rather he 
alluded to a broader test that would fairly balance the interests of the journalist and the 
government.  Id.  Indeed it appears that Justice Powell may have favored a qualified 
privilege but simply disagreed with Justice Stewart’s requirement that the government 
demonstrate a compelling interest to obtain the journalist’s information.  Id. at 402 
(conducting a historical analysis of Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg by comparing 
his opinion to his personal papers and memoirs).  See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 n* (Powell, 
J., concurring).  Such is evident in the final sentence of Justice Powell’s footnote that “[t]he 
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Overall, Branzburg and its “blank check” to the states have been nothing 
more than a model of muddle because the decision failed to give the 
states any guidance as to what type of privilege a reporter’s shield law 
should grant to newsgatherers.60  Hence, Branzburg’s blank check has 
allowed the states to cash in.61 
C. How the States Have Cashed in on the Blank Check 
This Section focuses on the state split as to which type of privilege a 
reporter’s shield law should grant to journalists.62  First, this Section 
furnishes a brief survey of the states and the privileges their shield laws 
provide to reporters.63  Next, this Section delineates those provisions of 
reporter’s shield laws upon which the states agree.64  Finally, it considers 
the contemporary issue that has sparked widespread disagreement 
among the states:  the scope of the privilege that reporter’s shield laws 
should grant to journalists to resist compulsory disclosure.65 
1. A Brief Survey:  The Split at a Glance 
Thirty-six jurisdictions in the United States have reporter’s shield 
laws in place.66  Twenty-three states grant a newsgatherer a qualified 
privilege to be free from compulsory disclosure except where a court is 
                                                                                                             
new constitutional rule endorsed by that dissenting opinion would, as a practical matter, 
defeat such a fair balancing and the essential societal interest in the detection and 
prosecution of crime would be heavily subordinated.”  Id. 
60 See Smolla, The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources, supra note 50, at 1426 
(referring to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Branzburg as a model of muddle due to the 
controversy that still surrounds the decision to this day).  See also infra Part II.C (examining 
the state split in great detail). 
61 See infra Part II.C (describing the four types of privileges that states employ in 
reporter’s shield laws). 
62 See infra Part II.C.3 (describing the four generic privileges that are employed by the 
states:  (1) an absolute privilege; (2) a qualified privilege; (3) a blended privilege; and, (4) 
immunity from contempt). 
63 See infra Part II.C.1 (offering a short assessment as to which states adhere to which 
privilege). 
64 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the two portions of reporter’s shield laws upon which 
the states concur:  those newsgatherers who are protected by shield laws and the 
proceedings in which the shield laws apply). 
65 See infra Part II.C.3 (outlining the four privileges granted to journalists by state 
reporter’s shield laws and elaborating on the scope of protection they grant to members of 
the media, how they apply, and the public policy concerns that underlie the different 
privileges). 
66 See Fargo, Analyzing Federal Shield Law Proposals:  What Congress Can Learn from the 
States, supra note 2, 46–48 (listing the states that have enacted reporter’s shield laws).  See 
also supra note 31 (listing the states, as well as the corresponding citations to their shield 
laws, that have enacted such legislation). 
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convinced that the privilege should be divested.67  Alternatively, ten 
states provide journalists an absolute privilege to resist compulsory 
disclosure in all situations.68  Further, two jurisdictions, New York and 
the District of Columbia, use a blended privilege granting journalists an 
absolute privilege to keep the confidentiality of their sources and a 
modified qualified privilege to maintain the confidentiality of the 
information obtained from those sources.69  Finally, California is the only 
state that grants journalists immunity from being held in contempt for 
refusing to reveal confidential sources and information.70 
2. States in Agreement  
Despite inconsistencies, states tend to agree on two main aspects of 
shield laws:  the proceedings in which they apply and the types of 
newsgatherers protected.71  With respect to proceedings, even though 
                                                 
67 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982) 
& ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2214 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (West 1987); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-119 & COLO. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-72.5-101 to 24-72.5-106 (West 1993); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146T (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1992); FLA. STAT. 
§ 90.5015 (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (West 1993); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (West 
1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1459 (West 1992); ME. PUB. L. CH. 654, signed into 
law on April 18, 2008; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 767.5A (1982); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (1998); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:84A-21–
2A:84A-21.13 (1996); N.M. STAT. § 38-6-7 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (1999); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-
19.1-3 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1996); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2007).  The states that have enacted shield laws bestowing journalists 
with qualified privileges include:  Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Washington. 
68 See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); 2008 HAW. SESS. LAWS ch. 240 § 1 (effective July 2, 
2008); IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1–34-46-4-2 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 1990); 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 26-1-903 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (1992); 
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.275–49.385 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04 & 2739.11–2739.12 
(West 1990); OR. REV. STAT., §§ 44.510–44.540 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (1993).  Those 
states employing absolute privileges are:  Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. 
69 See, e.g, D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to 16-4704 (1992) (providing an absolute privilege to a 
reporter to keep confidential the identity of a confidential source and a modified qualified 
privilege to maintain the confidence of certain information); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H 
(McKinney 1996) (same). 
70 CAL. CONST. ART. 1, § 2 (1993).  See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1993) (codifying 
California’s reporter’s shield law into the state’s rules of evidence); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1986.1 (West 2001) (codifying California’s shield law into the state’s rules of civil 
procedure). 
71 See Douglas H. Frazer, Comment, The Newsperson’s Privilege in Grand Jury Proceedings: 
An Argument for Uniform Recognition and Application, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 413, 413 
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Branzburg took place in a grand jury setting, states have designed their 
shield laws to apply in grand jury, criminal, civil, and other judicial 
proceedings and law enforcement investigations.72  Generally speaking, 
however, shield laws have a greater impact in criminal proceedings and 
investigations than in civil litigation.73 
The types of newsgatherers protected by shield laws vary from state 
to state.74  As a general proposition, states have adopted very broad 
definitions of what constitutes a journalist for the purpose of invoking a 
shield law’s privilege.75  Practically every state’s shield law protects any 
                                                                                                             
(1984) (stating that state reporter’s shield laws are applied in grand jury proceedings and 
investigations, criminal trials, and civil proceedings).  See generally Karl H. Schmid, 
Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings:  An Analysis of United States Courts of Appeals’ 
Decisions From 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441 (2002) (discussing how state 
reporter’s shield laws have been applied in state criminal proceedings and investigations 
and how these applications have been challenged and interpreted in federal court).  For 
discussions considering how state reporter’s shield laws have been interpreted in the 
federal courts through Federal Rule of Evidence 501 see Fargo & McAdoo, Common Law or 
Shield Law?  How Rule 501 Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem,, supra note 16; 
Graham, supra note 42, at 725–27; Nestler, supra note 42, at 250–55. 
72 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998) (requiring the shield law’s absolute privilege 
apply in any legal proceedings or elsewhere); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (stating the state’s 
qualified privilege gives a newsgatherer the privilege not to be a witness concerning their 
confidential sources and information); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (1985) (providing the 
shield law’s qualified privilege will order disclosure only if a court finds after a hearing 
that divestment of the privilege is justified); D.C. CODE § 16-4702 (1992) (stating that the 
shield law applies to any judicial, legislative, administrative, or other body with the power 
to issue a subpoena); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney 1996) (stating the shield law 
applies “in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding, or by the legislature or other 
body having contempt powers”). 
73 See, e.g., Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 444 n.14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) 
(“[I]n a civil discovery proceeding there is not a sufficient compelling state or public 
interest to outweigh the conditional First Amendment right not to disclose sources.”); 
Papandrea, supra note 33, at 557 n.234 (citing Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 
1981)) (“[I]n the ordinary case the civil litigant’s interest in disclosure should yield to the 
journalist’s privilege.”). 
74 See Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without 
Shield Laws, supra note 43, at 257–58 (emphasizing the different approaches that states 
adhere to in their reporter’s shield laws and noting that the varying definition of a reporter 
results in journalists being protected under one jurisdiction’s shield law but not under 
another).  See also infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (discussing the generally broad 
definition of a newsgatherer that nearly all states have adopted). 
75 See IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1 (1998) ((1) anyone “connected with . . . or employed by:  
(A) a newspaper or other periodical . . . ; or (B) recognized press association or wire 
service” or (2) with a licensed radio or television); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (“[P]erson 
regularly engaged in collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or 
publishing news, for gain or livelihood, who obtained the information sought while 
working as a salaried employee of, or independent contractor for, a newspaper, news 
journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station, network, 
or news magazine.”). 
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employee who is affiliated with any kind of news medium that 
broadcasts or publishes at regular intervals.76  Today, however, the only 
journalists most states exclude from protection are independent 
reporters; namely, those who use the Internet as their medium of 
dissemination, such as bloggers and e-journalists.77 
3. The Current Controversy 
Presently, states are at odds as to the extent of protection a shield 
law’s privilege should grant to members of the media.78  The privileges 
offered by state reporter’s shield laws can be placed into four general 
categories:  (i) an absolute privilege; (ii) a qualified privilege; (iii) a 
blended privilege; and (iv) immunity from contempt.79 
a. The Absolute Privilege 
An example of a state with a shield law that guarantees an absolute 
privilege is Indiana.80  In 1999, Indiana’s legislature recodified the state’s 
                                                 
76 See supra note 75; infra notes 84, 91, 102 (stating the broad definitions of the term 
journalist that are often incorporated into state reporter’s shield laws). 
77 See Durity, supra note 50, at 36–38 (discussing the need for reporter’s shield laws to 
draw a line between legitimate journalists and independent journalists who post directly to 
the Internet).  See also Nathan Fennessy, Comment, Bringing Bloggers into the Journalistic 
Privilege Fold, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 1059, 1075–78 (2006) (arguing that bloggers should be 
included under the definition of journalist because most bloggers post pursuant to an 
agreement of some kind with a legitimate news or media organization); Stephanie J. Frazee, 
Note, Bloggers as Reporters:  An Effect-Based Approach to First Amendment Protections in a New 
Age of Information Dissemination, 8 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 609, 625–31 (2006) (contending 
that all bloggers and e-journalists whose objective is to disseminate legitimate news should 
be protected under reporter’s shield laws). 
78 See Alexander & Bush, supra note 15, at 216–18 (discussing the split among the states 
as to the type of privilege to incorporate in a reporter’s shield law); Fargo, Analyzing Federal 
Shield Law Proposals:  What Congress Can Learn from the States, supra note 2, 46–49 (same).  See 
infra Part II.C.3 (detailing the state split in depth).  For a complete survey of the states and 
case law regarding reporter’s shield laws, see, supra note 3 (providing a thorough outline of 
the states that have adopted reporter’s shield laws as well as those states and federal 
circuits that have opted to adopt a common law reporter’s privilege); Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, Privilege Compendium, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/ (last 
visited Aug. 6, 2009) (listing information concerning current state reporter’s shield laws, the 
scope of each law, the privilege it grants, and the cases interpreting the shield law). 
79 See infra Part II.C.3 (explaining the various privileges and using as illustrations 
Indiana’s shield law as an example of the absolute privilege, Florida’s and Illinois’ shield 
laws as models of the qualified privilege, New York’s and the District of Columbia’s shield 
laws exemplifies the blended approach, and California’s demonstrates immunity from 
contempt). 
80 See IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998) (stating that a person falling under the provisions of 
the Indiana reporter’s shield law would be free from compulsory disclosure in any legal 
proceedings or elsewhere).  See also supra note 68 (listing the other states that have adopted 
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previous shield law, which gave newsgatherers an absolute privilege.81  
The recodification attempted to limit the effect of case law that had 
developed in the Indiana courts that appeared to support a qualified 
privilege.82  Since the inception of the current shield law, however, the 
                                                                                                             
shield laws that grant an absolute privilege to newsgatherers to resist compelled 
disclosure). 
81 See Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc, 469 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1984), overruled on different grounds, McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2000) 
(concluding the 1973 version of Indiana’s shield law conferred, without a doubt, an 
absolute privilege to newsgatherers); Hestand v. State, 273 N.E.2d 282, 283 (Ind. 1971).  The 
only limitation that the courts placed on the absolute privilege was that it was personal to 
newsmen and others could not invoke its protections.  Id. (emphasizing that Indiana’s 
reporter’s shield law creates a personal right for the reporter that cannot be invoked by the 
any other person regardless of whether he is connected to the litigation).  See also Lipps v. 
State, 258 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ind. 1970) (same). 
See Hestand, 273 N.E.2d at 283.  Indiana, which has changed or altered its reporter’s 
shield law several times, was one of seventeen states to have enacted a reporter’s shield law 
prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg.  Id. (listing the legislative history of 
the Indiana shield law:  “Acts of 1941, Ch. 44, § 1, p. 128, Acts of 1949, Ch. 201, § 1, p. 673, 
1968 Repl. Burns’ Ind.Stat.Ann. § 2-1733, IC 1971, 34-3-5-1,” amended by § 34-3-5-1 (1993)).  
See also Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Bradley, 462 N.E.2d 1321, 1324 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1984) (giving the 1973 version of Indiana’s shield law and accompanying legislative 
history); Jamerson, 469 N.E.2d at 1247 n.2 (explaining the 1941 version of Indiana’s shield 
law “afforded the news media an absolute privilege; however, it included particular 
requirements as to the size and circulation of the newspaper”). 
82  See, e.g., In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1, 10–16 (Ind. 1998) (discussing the conflicting 
interpretations of Branzburg and iterating that generally the Indiana courts have followed 
the absolute privilege that was enacted by the state’s legislature); WTHR-TV v. Milam, 690 
N.E.2d 1174, 1176–77 (Ind. 1998) (concluding that even for a litigant to attempt to access a 
newsgatherer’s information he must show some potential materiality, which is reasoning 
consistent with a qualified privilege).  See In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 4.  In re WTHR-TV 
involved a criminal defendant who had given an interview to a reporter.  Id.  Subsequent to 
the interview and the beginning of the defendant’s criminal proceedings, the defendant’s 
attorney subpoenaed the television station to obtain the uncut and unedited videotapes of 
the interview.  Id. at 5.  The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the videotapes could be 
discovered subject to in camera review.  Id. at 10.  The Court discussed the methods of 
discovery under Indiana Trial Rules 24(B)(1), 34(B) and 26(C), as well as how the Branzburg 
decision factored into whether the station could be compelled to disclose the videotapes of 
the interview.  Id. at 5–8, 10–12.  The Court concluded that in this situation, compulsory 
disclosure would not infringe the station’s or the reporter’s First Amendment rights, and 
that the inquiry in determining whether disclosure could be compelled was if the 
information consisted of particularity, relevance, and a paramount interest in 
nondisclosure.  See id. at 5–8, 10–15.  See Milam, 690 N.E.2d 1174 at 1175.  Along those same 
lines, Milam, which was decided on the very same day as In re WTHR-TV, involved an 
interview conducted with a criminal defendant before trial, which the defendant’s lawyer 
subsequently attempted to discover.  Id.  In this case, however, the defendant’s counsel 
simply asked for the material because it was related to the defendant’s case.  Id.  The Court 
concluded that discovery of the videotapes should not be compelled in this instance 
because the request for disclosure was not pleaded with particularity, was not material, 
and failed to indicate any possible use of the videotapes at the trial.  Id. at 1176. 
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Indiana judiciary appears to have acquiesced to the judgment of the 
legislature, as evidenced by the fact that no cases have interpreted 
Section 34-46-4-1 or Section 34-46-4-2 of the Indiana Code.83  Indiana’s 
shield law provides that those individuals who fall within the scope of 
the statute:84 
shall not be compelled to disclose in any legal 
proceedings or elsewhere the source of any information 
procured or obtained in the course of the person’s 
employment or representation . . . whether: 
(1) published or not published: 
(A) in the newspaper or periodical; or 
(b) by the press association or wire service; or 
(2) broadcast or not broadcast by the radio station 
or television station.85 
As shown, the absolute privilege grants complete protection to 
journalists.  The qualified privilege, on the other hand, is not as broad as 
the absolute privilege—it requires a reporter to disclose information if 
certain conditions are met.86 
b. The Qualified Privilege 
Florida’s shield law expressly grants a qualified privilege that 
extends to both confidential and non-confidential information gathered 
in the course of a journalist’s employment.87  The Florida Supreme Court 
                                                 
83 See, e.g, In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 10–16 (discussing Branzburg and stressing the 
importance and reasoning of Justice Powell’s concurrence).  The deference given by the 
Indiana courts is surprising because the courts appeared to disapprove of the absolute 
privilege, yet the absolute privilege remains the law in Indiana.  See id. 
84 See IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1 (1998) (defining a journalist to be:  “(1) any person 
connected with, or any person who has been connected with or employed by:  (A) a 
newspaper or other periodical . . .; or (B) a recognized press association or wire service” or 
“(2) any person connected with a licensed radio or television station”). 
85 IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998).  See In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d at 13 n.14.  The Indiana 
Supreme Court clarified in In re WTHR-TV, that “[t]he General Assembly has provided that 
a reporter ‘shall not be compelled to disclose in any legal proceedings or elsewhere the 
source of any information,’ whether published or not.”  Id.  See Slone v. State, 496 N.E.2d 
401, 405 (Ind. 1986).  In addition, the shield law has also been characterized as protecting 
“media representatives from being forced to give the sources of their news articles.”  Id. 
86 See infra Part II.C.3.b (exploring the application and public policy considerations 
supporting the adoption of a reporter’s shield law that incorporates a qualified privilege to 
resist compulsory disclosure). 
87 See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (enacting a qualified privilege for journalists to 
maintain the confidence of their information, but providing for divestment of the privilege 
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has held that if a reporter established that the qualified privilege 
attached, “a court must apply the three-prong balancing test used by an 
overwhelming majority of other states to determine whether the 
privilege will act to prevent the disclosure of the reporter’s 
information.”88  Also, the Florida Supreme Court pronounced the proper 
determination must be whether the party attempting to access the 
information “has established that:  (1) the reporter possesses relevant 
information; (2) the same information is not available from alternative 
sources; and (3) the movant has a compelling need for any information 
the reporter may have.”89  Interestingly, Florida’s law contains several 
instances where the shield law does not apply, including to physical 
evidence, eyewitness observations, and recordings of crimes.90  Further, 
                                                                                                             
under certain conditions).  See also State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998) (affirming 
the application of Florida’s reporter’s shield law as giving journalists a qualified privilege). 
88 Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227.  The Court reasoned that the development of state reporter’s 
shield laws post-Branzburg, as well as the varying state and federal court decisions 
recognizing a common law reporter’s privilege, proved that a balancing test was the best 
method of determining when a journalist should be compelled to disclose confidential 
information or the identity of any confidential source.  Id. at 227–28. 
89 Id. at 227.  The Court also gave examples of such situations, the first of which was in 
the context of a criminal prosecution, if the government was seeking compelled disclosure 
“it would have to establish that the information was relevant to the crime being 
investigated; that the government could not obtain the information from another source; 
and that the government has a compelling need to obtain the information to adequately 
prosecute the crime at issue.”  Id.  In weighing the compelling need of the party, however, a 
court must not only consider the need for the press to be free and unfettered and the 
obligation for courts to hear every man’s evidence, but also to “factor into the equation the 
federal and Florida constitutional rights to compulsory and due process so as to ensure that 
the defendant receives a fair trial.”  Id.  Interestingly, in supporting its rationale, the Court 
noted that Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg advocating an approach which would 
balance the interests of the parties furthered Florida’s emulation of Justice Stewart’s 
dissent.  Id. at 223–24. 
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (1985).  Other jurisdictions that adhere to the use of a 
qualified privilege, such as Illinois, favor a less stringent balancing test which requires 
disclosure only if:  “(1) . . .  the information sought does not concern matters, or details in 
any proceeding, required to be kept secret . . .; and (2) . . . all other available sources of 
information have been exhausted and, either, disclosure of the information sought is 
essential to the protection of the public interest involved.”  Id.  Thus, under Illinois’ shield 
law information only needs to be unprotected as a state secret in order for a party to 
attempt to divest the privilege by showing it is essential to protecting the public interest or 
all other sources have been exhausted.  See id.  See also People v. Pawlaczyk, 724 N.E.2d 901, 
912–13 (Ill. 2000) (emphasizing that Illinois’ reporter’s shield law reduces the burden on 
litigants trying to obtain information that a newsgatherer possesses and that litigants need 
not show a compelling need for the information). 
90 See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998); Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227 (holding consistent with the 
reporter’s shield law that “the privilege does not apply to eyewitness observations or 
physical evidence, including recordings, of a crime”) (emphasis in original).  Compare id., 
with Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 469–70 (explaining that there are three general exceptions 
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Florida’s shield law provides journalists with a qualified privilege not to 
testify about or to disclose information obtained while actively gathering 
news unless a party seeking to overcome this privilege can show by clear 
and specific evidence that:  “(a) The information is relevant and material 
to unresolved issues that have been raised . . .; (b) The information 
cannot be obtained from alternative sources; and (c) A compelling 
interest exists for requiring disclosure.”91 
Moreover, the legislative history supporting Florida’s shield law 
expressly states that the Florida Legislature intended to provide a 
qualified privilege to members of the media who fell within the 
definition of a professional journalist.92  Also, the summary of the bill 
indicates that a journalist has the power to refuse to be a witness 
concerning any information he obtained while actively gathering news.93  
According to the Florida Senate Staff’s analysis, the bill would enhance 
the media’s ability to collect news by promoting and protecting 
confidentiality while at the same time reducing the number of subpoenas 
served upon newsgatherers.94  Additionally, in support of the qualified 
privilege, the Staff’s analysis stressed the economic impact of the number 
of subpoenas served on members of the media and the increased costs to 
                                                                                                             
to the doctrinal framework of Branzburg when its reasoning is made inoperable:  civil 
litigation, the Sixth Amendment, and reporters who witness the crime). 
91 FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (defining professional journalist to encompass any person 
involved in “collecting, photographing, recording, writing, editing, reporting, or 
publishing news, for gain or livelihood, who obtained the information sought while 
working as a salaried employee of, or independent contractor for, a newspaper, news 
journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station, network, 
or news magazine”).  
92 Act of May 12, 1998, S.B. 150, 1998 Fla. Acts 22-150-98, at 2, available at 
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/1998/senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0150.pdf 
(outlining the intentions of the Florida Legislature and the public policy considerations 
justifying the Legislature’s intentions). 
93 Id.  The summary of the bill also provided for compulsory disclosure only when the 
conditions of the qualified privilege have been met.  Id.  See SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND 
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, JOURNALISM:  QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE, S.B. 150, at 3 (Fla. 1998), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/1998/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/ 
SB0150.go.pdf (citing Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 
399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).  Similarly, the legislative history endorses the adoption of 
the qualified privilege because Florida’s courts had already recognized a common law 
reporter’s privilege and had implemented a balancing test to make the privilege qualified.  
Id.  Also, the legislative history agrees with Justice Stewart’s dissent in Branzburg and 
explained that the adoption of a qualified privilege was pivotal to the interests of litigants, 
the public as a whole, and the media.  Id. at 4. 
94  SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 93, at 1.  In addition, the analysis found that the 
qualified privilege could possibly impede the discovery of certain evidence held by 
reporters in both criminal and civil proceedings.  Id.  In essence, Florida’s qualified 
privilege operates to exclude evidence that could otherwise be admissible and discoverable 
at trial, which is similar in some respects to the absolute privilege.  Id. at 2. 
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litigants to access the information collected by journalists.95  Finally, the 
Staff’s analysis recognized that advocates for an absolute privilege relied 
too heavily on the argument that the public has a right to know certain 
information because no such right is present under either the state or 
federal constitutions.96 
c. The Blended Privilege 
In recent years, two jurisdictions have developed a new statutory 
model by enacting contemporary and flexible shield laws that 
accommodate the interests of all parties.97  The District of Columbia’s 
shield law grants newsgatherers an absolute privilege to keep sources 
confidential, but only a qualified privilege for information a journalist 
acquires from confidential sources.98  The D.C. shield law “accords total 
protection to news sources, whether confidential or not, and whether 
disclosed to others or not.”99  Additionally, the D.C. shield law “prohibits 
compulsory disclosure of ‘the source of any news or information’ 
procured by a journalist ‘acting in an official news-gathering 
capacity.’”100  Moreover, the protection conferred to unpublished news 
or information may be divested if three requirements are satisfied.101 
                                                 
95 Id. at 5.  A problem that the Analysis identified was that the bill did not establish an 
explicit standard or burden of proof that challengers must meet to obtain the information 
in question.  Id. at 4.  Additionally, the Analysis noted that the qualified privilege would 
likely cause additional hearings in the cases in which it was invoked and would slow down 
the adjudicatory process.  Id. at 5.  This increased burden would be offset, however, by the 
reductions in the number of petitions for injunctions to protect reporters.  Id. 
96 Id. at 6.  The balance that Florida’s shield law strikes, according to the Staff Analysis, 
causes sources and information to be revealed only in limited instances and would not 
hinder the forthcoming of sources with newsworthy information.  Id. 
97 See infra Part II.C.3.c (explaining that the privilege these two jurisdictions have created 
actually blends the absolute privilege with the qualified privilege in order to accommodate 
a wide variety of interests). 
98 See Lee v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 287 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2003).  See D.C. CODE 
§ 16-4702 (1992).  Additionally, the D.C. shield law applies to sources, whether or not the 
source is confidential, and to any published or unpublished information including:  notes, 
outtakes, photographs, photographic negatives, video tapes, sound tapes, film, or other 
data.  Id. 
99 Grunseth v. Marriott Corp., 868 F. Supp. 333, 336 (D.D.C. 1994).  See Joel Kurtzberg & 
Karen Kaiser, First Amendment Reporter’s Privilege Challenged in Privacy Act Case, 22 COMM. 
LAW. 14, 15 (2004) (stating that the scope of the District of Columbia’s provision extends to 
undisclosed information collected during the newsgathering process). 
100 Lee, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (citing D.C. CODE § 16-4702(1)) (emphasizing the need for a 
journalist to be acting in his reportorial capacity in order for the D.C. reporter’s shield law 
to apply, otherwise journalists and litigants could find ways to circumvent the shield law). 
101 Grunseth, 868 F. Supp. at 336.  The court iterated that the criteria for applying the 
shield law’s conditional privilege for maintaining the confidentiality of news or 
information closely tracked the analytical framework set forth in Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 
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The District of Columbia’s shield law provides a modified qualified 
privilege which requires disclosure if: 
(1) The news or information is relevant to a significant 
legal issue before a judicial, legislative, administrative, 
or other body that has the power to issue a subpoena; 
(2) The news or information could not, with due 
diligence, be obtained by any alternative means; and 
(3) There is an overriding public interest in the 
disclosure.102 
A court may not, however, compel the disclosure of the identity of a 
source of any information that falls within the shield law’s protection.103 
Along these same lines, the New York Legislature enacted a similar 
reporter’s shield law that incorporates the blended privilege.104  In 
                                                                                                             
705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  Grunseth, 868 F. Supp. at 336–37.  See Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 712.  In Zerilli, 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that “when striking the balance between the 
civil litigant’s interest in compelled disclosure and the public interest in protecting a 
newspaper’s confidential sources, we will be mindful of the preferred position of the First 
Amendment and the importance of a vigorous press.”  Id.  The court emphasized that in 
striking this balance the need a litigant has for the information is of central importance, 
especially if “the information sought goes to ‘the heart of the matter,’ that is, if it is crucial” 
to the case.  Id. at 713 (citation omitted).  Also, the court imposed a limitation by requiring 
that “reporters should be compelled to disclose their sources only after the litigant has 
shown that he has exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information.”  Id. 
102 D.C. CODE § 16-4703.  See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney 1996).  Similarly, 
New York’s shield law mirrors the District of Columbia’s balancing test.  See id. (requiring 
the moving party to prove the need for the reporter’s information “(i) is highly material 
and relevant; (ii) is critical or necessary to the maintenance of a party’s claim, defense or 
proof of an issue material thereto; and (iii) is not obtainable from any alternative source”.  
Id. § 79-H(c).  Moreover, New York’s shield law defines a “Professional journalist” as 
anyone involved in the “gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping 
or photographing of news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press 
association or wire service or other professional medium or agency which has as one of its 
regular functions the processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to the 
public.”  Id. § 79-H(a)(6).  Contra D.C. CODE § 16-4701 (opting instead to structure its shield 
law to protect “news media” which encompasses:  “(1) Newspapers; (2) Magazines; (3) 
Journals; (4) Press associations; (5) News agencies; (6) Wire services; (7) Radio; (8) 
Television; or (9) Any printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of 
disseminating news and information to the public”). 
103 D.C. CODE § 16-4703.  Accord, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (giving journalists an 
absolute privilege to resist compelled disclosure of the identity of confidential sources). 
104 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (granting newsgatherers an absolute privilege to 
maintain the confidentiality of sources and a qualified privilege to keep information gained 
from those sources confidential under certain circumstances).  See also supra note 102 
(describing New York’s reporter’s shield law, the qualified privilege it gives to 
newsgatherers to resist disclosure of confidential information, and the shield law’s 
definition of journalist). 
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commenting on the legislative history of New York’s shield law, the 
state’s highest court explained in Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc., v. 
Greenberg105 that the “thrust of the Shield Law was aimed at encouraging 
a free press by shielding those communications given to the news media 
in confidence.”106  In addition, the court made clear that the legislature 
did not intend to create an absolute privilege against compelled 
disclosure because the legislature had not adopted it in any previous 
legislation.107 
d. Immunity Rather than Privilege 
The fourth and final option is to simply grant reporters immunity 
from being held in contempt for refusing to disclose a confidential source 
or confidential information pursuant to a subpoena or court order.108  
Although a reporter’s immunity under the California shield law has been 
characterized as absolute, it may be overcome under certain 
circumstances.109  For example, in Delaney v. Superior Court, the California 
                                                 
105 70 N.Y.2d 151 (N.Y. 1987) (concluding that the New York reporter’s shield law did not 
extend to non-confidential sources or information acquired by a news media organizations 
because without an expectation of confidentiality there cannot be an expectation that the 
communication or relationship between source and reporter is to remain privileged).  
106 Id. at 156 (citing Governor’s Memorandum, 1970 N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 508) 
(emphasizing that the Governor made clear in his memorandum to the legislature 
regarding New York’s reporter’s shield law that the shield law was enacted to combat the 
real and imminent threat of requiring a journalist to disclose his confidential information). 
107 Id. at 158.  See id. at 163–67 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (focusing in great detail as to the 
evolution of the legislative history of New York’s shield law and arguing that the drafters 
of the legislation intended for non-confidential information and non-confidential sources to 
be protected by the shield law). 
108 See CAL. CONST. ART. I. § 2 (1993).  Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 939 n.6 
(Cal. 1990).  To clarify, California’s shield law does not grant any kind of privilege to 
members of the media, rather it grants them immunity from being held in contempt by any 
judicial or legislative body that has the power to issue a subpoena or compel a witness’ 
testimony.  Id.  See also Nora Linda Rousso, Comment, California’s Newsgatherer’s Shield:  
Inconsistent Interpretation Means Inadequate Protection, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 347, 351–
55 (1989) (explaining that California’s shield law grants immunity to members of the media 
by preventing a journalist from being prosecuted for failing to comply with a subpoena or 
court order requiring him to testify about confidential sources or information). 
New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 811, 816 (Cal. 1990) (citing Mitchell v. 
Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984)).  Also, the scope of protection offered by 
California’s shield law is absolute, not qualified, which allows the shield law to apply to a 
journalist’s unpublished and non-confidential information.  Id.  A journalist’s immunity 
does not mean, however, that a court is forbidden from imposing other sanctions if a 
reporter refuses to comply with a subpoena or court-ordered testimony.  Id. at 817–18. 
109 See, e.g., Delaney, 789 P.2d at 947–50.  The California Supreme Court stressed that 
Delaney constituted a narrow qualification that was to be implemented exclusively in 
criminal proceedings where a criminal defendant’s state or federal constitutional rights are 
imperiled.  Id. at 947. 
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Supreme Court held that in a criminal proceeding the shield law’s 
immunity can be surpassed if a criminal defendant shows an acceptable 
need for the information.110  For a newsgatherer to be granted immunity 
under the California shield law he must prove all of the requirements of 
the shield law.111  If such a showing is made, the burden of proof then 
shifts to the criminal defendant to establish a reasonable possibility that 
the evidence could result in his exoneration.112 
Even if the defendant submits enough evidence to divest a reporter 
of his immunity, according to the Delaney court a journalist’s 
unpublished information is not necessarily subject to disclosure; rather, a 
                                                 
110 See id. at 948.  See also O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1457 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (stressing that the burden of proof is on the journalist seeking to invoke 
immunity to establish that the requirements of the shield law have been met, but that a 
criminal defendant must carry his own burden of showing the reporter has evidence in his 
possession that is important to the defendant’s case).  See also People v. Ramos, 101 P.3d 
478, 526 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 844 (2005) (stressing that the California reporter’s 
shield law requires that before the burden shifts to the journalist to demonstrate the 
requirements of the shield law have been established the criminal defendant must first 
prove that the information in the journalist’s possession must have a material effect on his 
case); People v. Vasco, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 643, 654 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (same).  See also 
Delaney, 789 P.2d at 948.  This does not, however, require that the information that the 
journalist possesses go to the heart of the defendant’s case.  Id.  In explaining the basis for 
the rule, the court explained the inquiry must measure the threat to a criminal defendants’ 
right to a fair trial particularly if he has “demonstrated a reasonable possibility that 
evidence sought to be discovered might result in his exoneration, he is entitled to its 
discovery.”  Id. at 947 (citing CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 241, 251 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1978) (emphasis omitted).  Moreover, the court emphasized that allowing a 
criminal defendant “to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled 
to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible 
information.”  Id. at 947–48 (emphasis omitted). 
111 Delaney, 789 P.2d at 946 n.20 (citing Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 
388, 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).  The burden that the journalist must satisfy in this situation is 
minimal in that Delaney only requires a “prima facie showing by a newsperson that he is 
entitled to withhold information under the shield law.”  Id. at 948.  Thus, in order to shift 
the burden to the criminal defendant to prove that immunity should not be granted, a 
newsgatherer must initially prove he falls within the shield law’s definition of a journalist, 
he has been lawfully subpoenaed, and he does not wish to testify about particular 
information.  Id. at 948–50.  Moreover, this initial requirement, according to the court, 
serves the shield law’s primary propose:  the protection of the media’s “ability to gather 
and report the news.”  Id. at 946 n.20. 
112 Id. at 948.  Yet, the court limited this requirement because it determined that 
exoneration was too high of a standard; rather, the court clarified that a defendant must 
“show a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his defense.”  Id. at 948 
n.24.  The distinction between exoneration and assisting the defense is significant.  Id. at 
948.  “‘Exoneration’ means ‘the removal of a burden, charge, responsibility, or duty.’”  Id. at 
948 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 516, col.2 (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis omitted).  The 
court further explained that the burden was on the defendant to make the required 
showing, but that the showing need not be specific and it could not rest on mere 
speculation.  Id. at 948. 
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balancing test should be employed to properly determine whether a 
reporter’s unpublished information could be discovered.113  Hence, for 
unpublished information to be disclosed, a court must consider:  “(a) 
Whether the unpublished information is confidential or sensitive . . . (b) 
The interests sought to be protected by the shield law . . . (c) The 
importance of the information to the criminal defendant . . . [and] (d) 
Whether there is an alternative source for the unpublished 
information.”114  These criteria suggest that the California shield law 
more closely resembles a qualified privilege than simply a grant of 
immunity; nonetheless, as it is worded in the California Constitution, the 
shield law makes reporters immune from being held in contempt for 
noncompliance with compulsory disclosure. 
Specifically, California’s shield law provides that those 
newsgatherers falling within the scope of the shield law: 
(b)  . . . shall not be adjudged in contempt . . . for 
refusing to disclose the source of any information 
procured . . . for publication . . . or for refusing to 
disclose any unpublished information . . . . 
Nor . . . adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose 
the source of any information procured . . . for news or 
news commentary purposes on radio or television, or for 
refusing to disclose any unpublished information . . . .115 
                                                 
113 Id. at 949–50.  See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b).  Further, the California shield law defines 
“unpublished information” as including but “not limited to, all notes, outtakes, 
photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public 
through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based upon 
or related to such material has been disseminated.”  Id. 
114 Delaney, 789 P.2d at 949–50 (emphasis omitted).  The court refused to place any weight 
on the enumerated factors that would militate in favor of disclosure in one instance and not 
in another.  Id.  Hence, none of the factors named by the court is determinative because 
such “[a] mechanistic, checklist approach would not in the long run (nor perhaps even in a 
particular case) serve the best interests of either newspersons or criminal defendants.”  Id. 
at 951.  Furthermore, the court extensively distinguished its holding in Delaney from that of 
Mitchell v. Superior Court, which was a civil case involving a claim of libel.  Id. at 949–51.  See 
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 632–34 (Cal. 1984).  In Mitchell, the California 
Supreme Court set forth a balancing test to resolve when a journalist must disclose 
confidential information during the course of civil proceedings.  Id. at 632–35.  The test 
devised by the court to be used in libel cases involved the contemplation of four factors:  (i) 
the nature of the proceeding; (ii) the desired information must go to the heart of the party’s 
case, not simply relevant; (iii) alternative sources have been exhausted; and (iv) the truth of 
the statements.  Id. 
115 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b).  See Delaney, 789 P.2d at 942–44.  California’s Constitution 
was amended by a referendum vote in which the voters approved the measure.  Id.  See 
Faucette: Your Secret's Safe with Me…or So You Think:  How States Have Cash
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
210 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
Because the citizens of California voted to incorporate California’s shield 
law into the state’s Constitution, the court examined the intent of the 
voters as opposed the legislature’s.116  The California Supreme Court has 
recognized that the intent of the voters can be determined by looking to 
the ballot argument supporting the proposed amendment.117  The ballot 
argument supporting the California shield law emphasized the extreme 
importance of the free flow of information to the public.118  The ballot 
argument contended that the free flow of information depended on a 
reporter’s ability to protect his sources.119  Justice Eagleson stated that “if 
this right is not protected, the real losers will be all Californians who rely 
on the unrestrained dissemination of information by the news media.”120  
Supporters of the shield law argued that the amendment would require 
the state’s judges to give greater protection to journalists before 
                                                                                                             
CAL. CODE EVID. § 1070 (West 1984); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 2001).  There are 
additional sources of the immunity that have been codified by California’s Legislature.  See 
CAL. CODE EVID. § 1070 (West 1984); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 2001).  Delaney, 
789 P.2d at 939 n.5.  These sections “are identical except for minor and insignificant 
differences in wording” and the minimal legislative history of the provisions were mooted 
when the constitutional amendment was passed by the voters.  Id.  See also, id. at 958–60 
(Broussard, J., concurring) (commenting on the minimal legislative history of Section 1070 
of the Code of Evidence and how it relates to Article 1, Section 2(b) of the California 
Constitution).  For an in-depth analysis of the development, amendments, and practical 
scope of § 1070 of California’s Code of Evidence, see Rousso, supra note 108, at 351–57 
(discussing the complexities of California’s three shield laws and how they relate to one 
another); Alger, supra note 40, at 177–209 (same). 
116 Delaney, 789 P.2d at 942.  California’s shield law originally existed in the state’s code of 
evidence and civil procedure; however, in 1980 the citizens of California amended the 
State’s Constitution to incorporate California’s shield law.  See id. at 942–43.  In essence, the 
passage of the amendment was similar to a recodification, but it also had the effect of 
negating the legislative history supporting the original shield law.  See id. 
117 Id. at 942–43.  The Delaney Court explained that although it was difficult to discern the 
intent of the voters in adopting a measure to amend the State’s Constitution, an acceptable 
and relevant source from which to ascertain the intent of the voters was the ballot 
argument that accompanied the proposition which enacted the amendment.  Id. at 943. 
118 Id. at 943 n.13. The ballot argument outlined that the free flow of information was 
being threatened due to certain exceptions which the California judiciary had carved out to 
the shield law set out in Section 1070 of the Code of Evidence.  Id.  The ballot argument 
premised this proposition on the fact that at least six reporters had been imprisoned for 
refusing to reveal their confidential sources.  Id. 
119 Id.  The ballot argument specifically stated that if a confidential source felt that a 
reporter would be forced to break his confidentiality, then a source would simply not come 
forward in the first place.  Id.  As such, the media’s usage of confidential sources was 
critical to the gathering and dissemination of news and must be protected.  Id. 
120 Id. (emphasis omitted).  The ballot argument also stressed that for democracy to work 
the citizenry must be informed, and to do so required the presence of a free press to serve 
as the watchdogs over our liberties and our nation.  Id. 
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compelling them to breach their confidentiality agreements with 
sources.121 
In sum, the state split illustrates that a newgatherer’s confidential 
sources and information are protected in one jurisdiction, but not in 
another.122  The inconsistencies among the states encumber the 
newsgathering process and endanger all of the benefits that flow from an 
informed society.123  Part III of this Note conducts a cost-benefit analysis 
of the four approaches to shield laws and arrives at the conclusion that 
the most practical and effective privilege to incorporate into a reporter’s 
shield law is the blended privilege.124 
III.  ANALYSIS:  THE TROUBLES AND TRIUMPHS OF BRANZBURG’S “BLANK 
CHECK” 
To determine which type of privilege states should incorporate into a 
reporter’s shield law, Part III conducts a cost-benefit analysis of each  
privilege.125  Section A analyzes the costs and benefits of the absolute 
                                                 
121 Id.  The ballot argument disclaimed that there was already a shield law on the books, 
Section 1070, which provided that reporters could not be held in contempt of court for 
declining to disclose sources when compelled to do so.  Id. 
122 See Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without 
Shield Laws, supra note 43, at 257–58 (stating that the state split was created because the 
states enacted their reporter’s shield laws in an ad hoc manner).  JOSEPH W. GLANNON, 
EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS:  CIVIL PROCEDURE 168 (5th ed. 2007).  Thus, in these federalists 
tendencies illustrate a hallmark of the American legal system: “the law could be one thing 
in Rome and another in Athens, if the legislature so declared it.”  Id.  This reflects the 
fundamental precept that underlies this jurisdictional conflict:  Indianans are different from 
Floridians, just as New Yorkers are different from Californians.  See id.  The citizens of each 
state have different concerns and challenges that they face; therefore, it is only logical that 
the states tailor their approach accordingly so as to perpetuate the lives of its citizens.  Id. 
123 See Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without 
Shield Laws, supra note 43, at 257–59. 
124 See infra Part III (conducting a cost-benefit analysis of each type of privilege 
implemented by state reporter’s shield laws). 
125 See infra Part III (analyzing the different privileges by outlining the costs and benefits 
associated with each methodology as derived from three criteria:  the application of the 
privilege, the parties and interests each privilege serves, and the public policy 
considerations underlying each privilege).  See Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Unintended Consequences, and Evidentiary Policy:  A Critique and a Rethinking of the Application 
of a Single Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1585, 1585 
(1998).  Basically, a cost-benefit analysis is a technique that quantitatively evaluates 
whether to follow a particular course of action or make a change in approaching an action, 
method, or conduct.  See id.  Traditionally, the cost-benefit analysis is used in financial 
decisions; however, it can be molded to study a vast array of situations and has been 
widely used in the field of law and economics.  See id. at 1599. 
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privilege, while Section B examines the qualified privilege.126  Next, 
Section C considers the blended privilege developed by New York and 
the District of Columbia.127  Finally, Section D evaluates California’s 
method that grants journalists immunity from being held in contempt.128  
Part III concludes that, as a whole, the most practical and effective 
privilege to incorporate into a reporter’s shield law is the blended 
privilege.129 
A. The Absolute Privilege:  An Inherently Flawed Approach 
This Section scrutinizes the costs and benefits of a shield law 
granting newsgatherers an absolute privilege to resist compulsory 
disclosure.130  First, this Section outlines the benefits created by the 
implementation of an absolute privilege.131  Second, this Section 
examines the costs associated with the absolute privilege.132  Finally, this 
Section examines the costs and benefits of the absolute privilege and 
concludes that the absolute privilege is inherently flawed.133 
Three primary benefits flow from a reporter’s shield law that 
incorporates an absolute privilege.134  The first is that the absolute 
                                                 
126 See infra Parts III.A–B (evaluating the costs and benefits associated with the absolute 
privilege and the qualified privilege and determining that the costs of both privileges 
outweigh their benefits). 
127 See infra Part III.C (considering the costs and benefits of the blended approach and 
finding that the benefits outweigh the costs). 
128 See infra Part III.D (exploring the costs and benefits of granting immunity to 
newsgatherers and concluding that this approach is altogether inadequate). 
129 See infra Part III.E (determining that the blended privilege is the only privilege whose 
benefits outweigh its costs, thus making the blended privilege an optimal methodology for 
state shield laws). 
130 See infra Part III.A (conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the absolute privilege by 
espousing the positive and negative aspects of the absolute privilege). 
131 See infra Part III.A (highlighting the benefits connected to the absolute privilege:  (i) 
combating the chilling effect compulsory disclosure has on the dissemination of news to 
the public; (ii) directly protecting confidential sources and information, which allows the 
media to be the citizenry’s watchdog over government action; and (iii) inhibiting the use of 
fishing expeditions by litigants and government agencies). 
132 See infra Part III.A (explaining the costs of the absolute privilege, which include 
preventing otherwise material and admissible evidence from being introduced, inhibiting 
law enforcement from fully performing their job, and hindering the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and credibility of the judicial system). 
133 See infra Part III.A (finding that the absolute privilege is inherently flawed because it 
provides comprehensive protection for newsgatherers and confidential sources and 
completely neglects the interests of litigants, government agencies and law enforcement, 
and the judicial system). 
134 See, e.g, infra notes 135–38, 140, 145 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits 
stemming from an absolute privilege:  combating the chilling effect; creating an educated 
and informed citizenry; guaranteeing the free flow of information and the public’s right to 
know; allowing professional journalists to adhere to the ethical obligations of 
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privilege directly combats the chilling effect that compulsory disclosure 
could have on the dissemination of news to the public.135  By tackling the 
chilling effect head-on, the absolute privilege advances the public policy 
concern of having information flow as freely as possible to the public.136  
An unfettered press and unrestricted stream of information enhances the 
public’s right to know and fosters an informed and educated public.137  
Perhaps more significant, however, is that fighting the chilling effect 
directly protects a reporter’s confidential source and confidential 
information.138  Hence, by striving to prevent the chilling effect, the 
                                                                                                             
newsgathering; having the press to serve as a the public’s watchdog; and, prohibiting 
fishing expeditions). 
135 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 714–15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the newsgathering process would be severely impeded if confidential sources were left 
unprotected, which would hasten the onset of the chilling effect).  See Campagnolo, supra 
note 1, at 452 (stressing that the chilling effect is not only a grave concern, but also a 
probable likelihood if reporter’s shield laws do not ensure protection for confidential 
sources); Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously:  Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the 
Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1073 (stating that 
protecting confidential sources helps to guarantee the free flow of information and the 
public’s right to know by facilitating the quick collection and dissemination of news); 
Papandrea, supra note 33, at 535–36 (the purpose of shield laws is to preserve the 
dissemination of information into the public discourse); Weinberg, supra note 33, at 175 
(stating that a reporter’s shield law assures the free flow of information to the public so that 
citizens and leaders can make well-informed and educated decisions).  See also supra notes 
48, 54 (explaining the theory of the chilling effect:  if source confidentiality was not 
protected then sources would be reluctant to come forward and give newsworthy 
information to journalists, which in turn could have adverse repercussions for the public). 
136 E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-144 (1992) (stating that the legislative intent behind the 
enactment of Nebraska’s absolute privilege was to guarantee the uninhibited flow of 
information to the public, which was supported by the policy rationale that compelling 
reporters to disclose sources runs contrary to the public interest).  But see SENATE STAFF 
ANALYSIS, supra note 93, at 6 (emphasizing that the legislative history supporting Florida’s 
reporter’s shield law concluded that those jurisdictions that grant absolute privileges to 
journalists as opposed to qualified privileges place too much emphasis on the argument 
that the public has a right to know); supra note 96 and accompanying text (same). 
137 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 712–14 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing for an absolute 
privilege and reasoning that the fundamental right of the press to remain free from 
government intrusion also means the citizenry has a substantial right to know the 
information upon which the media reports).  See also Meiklejohn, supra note 53, at 254 
(stating that the First Amendment is designed to protect the people and freedom of the 
press helps to secure this protection). 
138 See Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1601 (stating that disclosure inhibits 
confidential communications between journalists and their sources); GERPEN, supra note 35, 
at 58–103 (arguing that compulsory disclosure, which the absolute privilege combats, 
inhibits a source from communicating with a journalist and should be offered protection 
since the source/journalist relationship is similar to other types of privileged relationships).  
See also Dicke, supra note 41, at 1565 n.64 (noting that sheltering a source’s agreement of 
confidentiality with a newsgatherer spawns a correlated benefit of the absolute privilege:  it 
lets members of the media act in accordance with their own canons of professional ethics); 
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absolute privilege not only bolsters the interests of the press and the 
public at large, but also secures a source’s confidentiality.139 
A second and related benefit is that the absolute privilege allows the 
media to be the public’s watchdog over the government.140  The 
underlying theory is that the absolute privilege creates a truly free press 
that acts as an unofficial check on the power and actions of the branches 
of state and federal government.141  As Alexander Meiklejohn suggests, a 
free press is essential to the Bill of Rights, and the Bill of Rights is 
essential to our democratic values of freedom and independence because 
open lines of communication and the quick dissemination of information 
facilitate a republican form of government.142  Hence, this watchdog role 
gives the media greater latitude to examine the actions of the 
government, which provides the public with an extra measure of 
security from improper government conduct.143 
A final benefit of the absolute privilege is that it inhibits the use of 
fishing expeditions by litigants and the government.144  The prevention 
                                                                                                             
Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously:  Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and the Uncertain 
Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1068 (discussing the journalistic 
tradition of unabashedly protecting a source of information). 
139 See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text (reasoning that the first benefit of the 
absolute privilege is that it prevents the dissemination of news from being chilled because 
it completely protects the interests of a newsgatherer’s confidential sources). 
140 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (opining that the media performs 
a critical function in our society by acting as the people’s watchdog over the government; 
hence, the media is an unofficial check on the power of government).  See also Alexander, 
supra note 10, at 105–06 (tracing the history of the watchdog concept and explaining that 
the notion of the media  as the watchdog of the people is essential to the functioning of our 
own self-government). 
141 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727–28 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stressing that the media’s 
true role in America is not simply to keep citizens informed and educated about the news 
and events, but to keep government, at all levels, as honest as possible so as to effectuate 
the interests of the people). 
142 See generally Meiklejohn, supra note 53, at 254 (arguing that the Bill of Rights 
established that government exists because the people allow it to do so, therefore the 
freedom the First Amendment guarantees the press is in furtherance of the Framers’ 
intentions for the people to govern themselves). 
143 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 106–07, 109 (stating that one of the most valuable 
services the media provides is facilitating the public’s right to know by acquiring 
information and news that is typically otherwise inaccessible to the general public).  See also 
supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text (analyzing that a benefit of the absolute 
privilege is that it allows the press to be the people’s watchdog, in order to ensure their 
interests are secure). 
144 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that fishing 
expeditions cause injury to a reporter’s First Amendment rights because they are not based 
on probable cause nor on any sufficient evidence that the reporter possesses information 
would aid a litigant’s case).  See Jones, supra note 4, at 626.  The need to prevent the use of 
fishing expeditions is critical, as is illustrated by a 2006 national survey conducted by 
Professor RonNell Jones which found that in 2006 alone 761 responding news and media 
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of fishing expeditions requires litigants to conduct their own discovery 
and develop their own case, as opposed to simply relying on the 
information and evidence gathered by journalists.145  Furthermore, 
combating fishing expeditions not only prevents disclosure of the 
information gained from a reporter’s source, but more importantly, 
insulates the reporter’s own work product and thought process from 
compulsory disclosure.146  Granting members of the press the ability to 
maintain the secrecy of their own work product, which is more often 
than not the target of these fishing expeditions, undoubtedly serves the 
professional interests of the individual journalist.147  Nevertheless, the 
general public also benefits from the absolute privilege’s prohibition on 
fishing expeditions because it requires government officials to efficiently 
allocate government resources and prohibits litigants from clogging the 
courts with needless discovery requests.148 
In sum, the policy considerations and reasoning supporting the 
absolute privilege predominantly furthers the interests of the press.149  
                                                                                                             
organizations reported that its newsgatherers had received nearly three thousand five 
hundred subpoenas.  Id.  See also supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that a 
recent trend has been that litigants and branches or agencies of the government attempting 
to access a reporter’s confidential information do so in order to avoid taking the time to 
develop their own case or investigation, thus relying entirely on the journalist to do the 
work for them). 
145 See Carter, supra note 35, at 183 (citing Boutrous & Stodder, supra note 35, at 23) 
(stating that a one of the primary purposes of reporter’s shield laws and the privileges they 
grant to journalists is to eliminate unnecessary subpoenas served upon newsgatherers by 
litigants that are on fishing expeditions). 
146 See, e.g., Alexander & Bush, supra note 15, at 215 (noting that newsgatherers are often 
subpoenaed not just to testify in court, but to turn over any and all confidential and/or 
unpublished information the journalist has accumulated); Alger, supra note 40, at 167 
(highlighting that journalists tend to make particularly qualified and effective witnesses 
because they are typically very well-organized and take copious notes of the interviews, 
events, and stories that they cover). 
147 See Dicke, supra note 41, at 1565 n.64 (citing AMERICAN NEWSPAPER GUILD, CODE OF 
ETHICS (1934)) (discussing the professional responsibilities imposed on journalists and the 
importance to the profession of a newsgatherer being able to maintain the confidentiality of 
his work product). 
148 See Carter, supra note 35, at 183 (citing Boutrous & Stodder, supra note 35, at 23) 
(explaining that shield laws prevent fishing expeditions by litigants and government 
officials and agencies by deterring unnecessary subpoena applications and discovery 
requests).  See also supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (giving rise to the inference 
that sources of information and the public at large are indirectly protected from the 
absolute privilege’s direct insulation of newsgatherers from needless fishing expeditions). 
149 See generally Part III.A (asserting that the benefits of the absolute privilege, taken as a 
whole, show that the parties whose interests are by far best served under the absolute 
privilege are those of the media and confidential sources). 
Faucette: Your Secret's Safe with Me…or So You Think:  How States Have Cash
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
216 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
The general public benefits as well, albeit to a lesser extent.150  The 
greatest benefit of the absolute privilege, however, is that it offers 
complete protection for confidential sources.151  Nevertheless, the 
implementation of a reporter’s shield law granting newsgatherers an 
absolute privilege does not come without costs.152  The interests of three 
parties are affected by the absolute privilege:  individual litigants, the 
government and its law enforcement agencies, and the judicial system.153 
The first and most significant cost of the absolute privilege is that it 
prevents litigants from obtaining information that could otherwise be 
admitted as evidence in court.154  Some of the information and evidence 
journalists acquire is not only advantageous to a litigant, but is often 
critical to the merits and disposition of a litigant’s case.155  This is 
particularly so in criminal proceedings where convictions or acquittals 
depend upon the ability of the parties to access sensitive or confidential 
information that a newsgatherer has in his possession.156  Similarly, this 
                                                 
150 See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text (arguing that the interests of the public 
and of confidential sources are furthered by the fact that the absolute privilege facilitates 
the free flow of information to the public and precludes the chilling effect from occurring 
by totally safeguarding the confidentiality of sources). 
151 See, e.g., note 138 and accompanying text (describing that a significant aspect of the 
absolute privilege is that it grants comprehensive protection to confidential sources, which 
combats the collection and dissemination of news from being chilled, facilitates the free 
flow of information, and serves the public’s right to know; all of which results in a well-
educated citizenry that can make intelligent decisions). 
152 See infra Part III.A (the three primary costs of the absolute privilege are as follows:  (1) 
it disregards the interests that litigants may have in accessing certain information; (2) it 
impedes the ability of law enforcement to fully investigate criminal matters; and, (3) it 
hinders the judicial process by not allowing courts to obtain evidence that would otherwise 
be admissible). 
153 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (holding that grand juries must have 
the right to subpoena witnesses and hear every man’s evidence); Watkins v. United States, 
354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957) (concluding that congress has the power to require compulsory 
disclosure of any information that falls within its legislative sphere).  See also Papandrea, 
supra note 33, at 535, 541–42 (stating that shield laws can aid in the prevention of crime by 
giving law enforcement access to sensitive information). 
154 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (emphasizing the importance that every man’s evidence 
has in the administration of justice); State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. 1998) (reasoning 
that every man’s evidence is necessary for courts to be effective). 
155 See In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1, 4, 10 (Ind. 1998) (ruling that Indiana’s reporter’s 
shield law, which gives journalists an absolute privilege to resist compulsory disclosure, 
prevented a defendant who was on trial for murder from accessing video tapes of an 
interview he had with a television reporter about his crime before he had the opportunity 
to consult with his attorney); WTHR-TV v. Milam, 690 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (Ind. 1998) 
(holding that Indiana’s reporter’s shield law precluded a criminal defendant’s ability to 
discover video tapes that consisted of outtakes from a television interview the defendant 
gave before the start of his trial). 
156 See generally Papandrea, supra note 33, at 584–85 (explaining that in jurisdictions that 
do not have absolute privileges, it is often very difficult, if not impossible, for a litigant in 
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raises the concern that because a criminal defendant’s liberty is at stake, 
he should have access to all of the evidence that could have a bearing 
upon the disposition of his case.157  Thus, a considerable cost of the 
absolute privilege is that it is inequitable because it divests the rights of 
litigants to resort to the courts and have their cases decided on the basis 
of all relevant and material evidence.158 
A second detriment of the absolute privilege is that it hinders the 
ability of government and law enforcement agencies to fully perform 
their duties, by prohibiting access to certain information.159  This creates 
evidentiary gaps that cause errors to occur in the criminal justice system, 
which can lead to faulty convictions or acquittals.160  The growing need 
for law enforcement and the courts to access relevant material that a 
journalist may have in his possession is evidenced by the increasing 
number of subpoenas issued to news and media organizations, which 
was more than three thousand in 2006.161  This gives rise to a third and 
costly detriment of the absolute privilege:  it impedes the effectiveness 
                                                                                                             
civil proceedings to access a newsgatherer’s confidential information because he must 
show a compelling or overriding need for the information).  See also supra note 73 and 
accompanying text (explaining that parties in civil proceedings typically cannot divest a 
journalist’s protection from compulsory disclosure even in jurisdictions not employing the 
absolute privilege, because litigants are often required to satisfy enhanced burdens of 
proof). 
157 See Schmid, supra note 71, at 1473 (discussing the detrimental effect a criminal 
defendant faces in court, particularly in federal court, if he is not allowed to access certain 
information or evidence in a journalist’s possession simply because of a state’s reporter’s 
shield law). 
158 See supra notes 154–57 (explaining a significant cost of the absolute privilege is its 
rigidity in that a litigant, whether civil or criminal, faces the simple truth that no matter 
how much need he may have for obtaining information in a journalist’s possession, a 
reporter’s shield law that incorporates an absolute privilege will bar his every attempt to 
access that information). 
159 See Papandrea, supra note 33, at 541–43 (noting that reporter’s shield laws can both 
help law enforcement with crime prevention and undercut their efforts to do so, 
particularly those shield laws that incorporate the use of an absolute privilege, because the 
absolute privilege acts as a barrier to all information that could potentially aid law 
enforcement). 
160 See Peter Meyer, BALCO, the Steroids Scandal, and What the Already Fragile Secrecy of 
Federal Grand Juries Means to the Debate Over a Potential Federal Media Shield Law, 83 IND. L.J. 
1671, 1672 (2008) (discussing that shield laws can prevent a grand jury, prosecutor, or 
defendant from accessing information in a reporter’s possession that would otherwise be 
discoverable; thus, the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence could possibly cause a 
state reporter’s shield law to be outcome-determinative). 
161 See Jones, supra note 4, at 626 (discussing an extensive national survey conducted in 
2006 of over seven hundred news and media organizations pertaining to the growing 
number of subpoenas being issued to newsgatherers). 
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and credibility of the justice system.162  As more subpoenas are requested 
and issued, the judicial process slows down because more resources are 
allocated to applying for, investigating, and granting subpoenas and 
court orders requesting a newsgatherer to disclose information.163  Even 
more troubling, as the interests of reporters are given more deference, 
the public’s confidence in the judicial process begins to diminish, which 
causes the judicial system to lose its reliability.164  Therefore, two serious 
costs of the absolute privilege are that it places an undue burden on law 
enforcement and puts the trustworthiness of our judicial system in 
peril.165 
The cost-benefit analysis of the absolute privilege shows that the 
costs of the absolute privilege outweigh its benefits.166  This result is 
premised on the finding that the absolute privilege places emphasis 
solely on the interests of the media, and does not accommodate litigants, 
law enforcement, or the court system.167  In effect, the absolute privilege 
makes the rights and interests of litigants and the government 
subordinate to those of the press.168  The preeminent benefit of the 
absolute privilege is that it prevents the dissemination of news from 
                                                 
162 See SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 93, at 5–6 (Fla. 1998), available at 
http://www.flsenate.gov/ data/session/1998/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/SB0150.go.pdf 
(suggesting that an absolute privilege detrimentally affects the judicial system because the 
scope of the privilege is unclear and causes more judicial resources to be allocated to 
resolving disputes). 
163 See Jones, supra note 4, at 626–27 (emphasizing that the thousands of subpoena 
requests and applications for reporters to divulge certain information that flood the court 
system each year place a heavy burden on scarce judicial resources). 
164 See supra notes 160, 162–163 (stating that placing too much weight on protecting the 
media and confidential sources has the adverse effect of jeopardizing the integrity of the 
judicial system). 
165 See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text (determining that the absolute 
privilege’s inflexible deference to the media and confidential sources hinders law 
enforcement efforts to investigate crimes and negatively affects the judicial system). 
166 See infra notes 167–71 (concluding that the costs of the absolute privilege outweigh its 
benefits because the costs demonstrate that the absolute privilege is stubbornly 
uncompromising in the way it prefers the interests of the media and confidential sources 
over those of litigants, law enforcement, government agencies, and the courts). 
167 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (emphasizing the importance that 
every man’s evidence has in the administration of justice and the need for litigants, 
especially a criminal defendant, to be able to access information that goes to the heart of his 
case); State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. 1998) (reasoning that every man’s evidence is 
essential for the judicial process to be effective).  See also supra note 154 and accompanying 
text (observing that a detrimental cost of the absolute privilege is that it excludes otherwise 
admissible evidence from discovery and introduction at trial). 
168 See Sherwin, supra note 36, at 139 (citing DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS 
OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 121 (1996)) (discussing the natural tension that exists 
between journalists, confidential sources, litigants, law enforcement, and the judicial 
system). 
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being chilled, by guaranteeing protection for a reporter’s confidential 
sources, yet the other benefits come at too great a cost.169  Although the 
press must be free, the rights that litigants and the government have to 
access critical information and evidence are at the very least equal to 
those of the media.170  Hence, the absolute privilege, standing alone, is an 
inherently flawed approach to reporter’s shield laws.171 
B. The Qualified Privilege:  Reasonable, But Not Entirely Practical 
This Section evaluates the costs and benefits that follow the 
implementation of a qualified privilege in a reporter’s shield law.172  This 
Section begins by highlighting the benefits of the qualified privilege.173  
Next, this Section explores the costs of the qualified privilege.174  Finally, 
this Section weighs the costs and benefits of the qualified privilege and 
determines that the qualified privilege is reasonable, but not entirely 
practical in its application.175 
The benefits of the qualified privilege are three-fold: (1) it advances 
the fair and equitable administration of justice; (2) it cuts down the 
transaction costs associated with litigation; and (3) it makes the courts 
operate more efficiently and effectively.176  First, the qualified privilege 
addresses the public policy concern of ensuring the fair and equitable 
                                                 
169 See infra note 170 (concluding that the tension between the media, confidential 
sources, litigants, government and law enforcement agencies, and courts demands a less 
rigid approach than the absolute privilege). 
170 See generally Davis, 720 So. 2d at 227–28 (emphasizing that under the absolute 
privilege, it would not make a difference whether a reporter’s confidential information was 
material to a litigant’s case or could have a bearing on the outcome of a case, it is always 
excluded from discovery and this result is inequitable and unfair). 
171 See supra note 170 (emphasizing that the absolute privilege is inherently flawed 
because it does not accommodate the needs and interest of all parties concerned, rather it 
clearly gives preference to the interests of the media and confidential sources). 
172 See infra Part III.B (examining the costs and benefits of the qualified privilege). 
173 See infra Part III.B (outlining and analyzing the benefits of the qualified privilege). 
174 See infra Part III.B (identifying and studying the costs of the qualified privilege). 
175 See infra Part III.B (weighing the costs and benefits of the qualified privilege and 
determining the qualified privilege is a more reasonable approach than the absolute 
privilege, but causes impractical and unacceptable results in certain situations). 
176 See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 744, 747–48 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the fairness of the judicial process demands that a reporter’s 
privilege, whether found under common law or codified, must account for the interests of 
all parties to the litigation on a case-by-case basis); SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 93, 
at 1, 5 (explaining that a reporter’s shield law with a qualified privilege decreases the 
transaction costs of litigation, which, in turn, reduces the amount of trials, hearings, 
motions, and discovery and frees judicial resources, which allows the courts to operate 
more efficiently). 
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administration of justice.177  The qualified privilege achieves this goal 
because it strikes a balance between the competing interests of the 
media, the litigants, and the government.178  The qualified privilege 
tends, however, to favor a newsgatherer’s interest in maintaining 
confidentiality because the party attempting to obtain the information 
must meet a high burden of proof in order for a court to force the 
revelation of the newsgatherer’s confidential information.179  Thus, by 
balancing the interests of the parties, the qualified privilege arrives at a 
result that is fair and equitable because it gives litigants the opportunity 
to access evidence in a journalist’s possession.180 
A second benefit is that the qualified privilege reduces the 
transaction costs of litigation to litigants and to news organizations as 
well.181  Transaction costs are reduced because the qualified privilege 
offers a framework for analyzing when compelled disclosure is likely to 
be authorized by a court.182  The result is a considerable reduction in the 
                                                 
177 See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744, 747–48 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stressing the 
proper inquiry should be to balance the interests of all parties on a case-by-case basis in 
order to determine whether to divest a newsgatherer’s privilege to resist compelled 
disclosure). 
178 See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (providing a qualified privilege that requires the 
moving party to show the confidential information subpoenaed to be material to his claim, 
unavailable from other reasonable means, and the movant has a compelling need for the 
information); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (West 1985) (granting journalists a qualified 
privilege, but, in contrast to the Florida shield law, only requiring the movant to show the 
information was not a matter of secrecy, all other resources for the information had been 
exhausted, and disclosure was necessary to protect the public interest involved in the case, 
rather than the litigant) (emphasis added).  But see N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney 
1996) (modified qualified privilege requiring proof that the need for the reporter’s 
information “(i) is highly material and relevant; (ii) is critical or necessary to the 
maintenance of a party’s claim, defense or proof of an issue material thereto; and (iii) is not 
obtainable from any alternative source”; hence, no personal need nor public interest must 
be served under New York’s modified qualified privilege). 
179 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (requiring the litigant to show a compelling need); D.C. 
CODE § 16-4703 (1999) (although adopting a blended privilege, the modified qualified 
privilege encapsulated in the District of Columbia’s blended privilege requires the showing 
of an overriding public interest); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (same). 
180 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (elucidating that the underlying notion 
of fairness that permeates the qualified privilege, by giving litigants or government 
agencies the opportunity to access a journalist’s confidential information, including the 
identity of a confidential source, makes the qualified privilege a more equitable approach 
than the absolute privilege). 
181 See infra notes 182–83 (explaining that the qualified privilege reduces the transaction 
costs of litigation by adding stability to the analytical framework of a reporter’s shield law, 
which brings about a corresponding drop in the number of discovery and subpoena 
requests, hearings, court filings, and attorneys fees).   
182 E.g., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 93, at 1, 5 (stating that the legislative history 
supporting Florida’s qualified privilege emphasized the belief that the adoption of a 
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number of subpoenas seeking the discovery of a journalist’s information 
or source and a corresponding drop in the transaction costs of the 
litigation.183  The litigants are not the only ones that benefit from the 
reduced transaction costs, because as costs to the parties decrease, so too 
do the judicial resources allocated to managing the case.184  In turn, this 
creates a third benefit of the qualified privilege:  judicial economy and 
effectiveness.185  Hence, the qualified privilege creates judicial economy 
by trimming down the number of subpoenas issued by a court, which 
frees up judicial resources and allows the courts to work more efficiently 
and economically.186 
As a whole, the principal benefit of the qualified privilege is that it 
produces fair and equitable administration of justice by offering litigants 
and the government an opportunity to discover information and 
evidence that is critical to a case or investigation.187  Also, the qualified 
privilege gives considerable deference and protection to a reporter’s 
ability to keep his information and sources confidential by requiring an 
exacting standard to be met before disclosure is compelled.188  Moreover, 
the qualified privilege’s analytical framework causes a reduction in the 
transaction costs of litigation and creates greater judicial efficiency and 
judicial economy.189 
                                                                                                             
qualified privilege would reduce the number of subpoenas filed, which would then drive 
down transaction costs associated with litigation). 
183 Id. at 1–5 (explaining that added predictability would cause a decrease in the number 
of subpoenas issued by courts and would thus reduce other transaction costs of litigation 
such as attorney’s fees, court costs, and filing fees). 
184 Id. at 5 (noting that the Florida Legislature found further support for adopting a 
qualified privilege into the state’s reporter’s shield law because as transaction costs are 
reduced for litigants there is an analogous drop in the workload of the courts, which frees 
judicial resources to be allocated elsewhere). 
185 See id. at 1, 5 (stating that the qualified privilege leads to increased efficiency in the 
judicial system because less judicial resources would have to be spent on managing cases 
pertaining to a state’s reporter’s shield law). 
186 See id. 
187 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (explaining that a constructive aspect of 
the qualified privilege is that it takes into account the needs and interests of all parties and 
lets litigants and government agencies obtain certain information in a journalist’s 
possession if the circumstances so require). 
188 E.g., supra note 179 and accompanying text (emphasizing that although the qualified 
privilege gives litigants the opportunity to divest the journalist’s privilege there is still 
considerable deference granted to a journalist’s privilege, which is evident in the fact that 
the qualified privilege requires a moving party to meet a high burden of proof before a 
court will deprive a newsgatherer of his right to maintain the confidentiality of information 
and sources). 
189 See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text (stating that other benefits of the 
qualified privilege include reduced transaction costs for litigants which subsequently leads 
to a more efficient court system). 
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On the other hand, two costs follow the qualified privilege.190  The 
first and most glaring cost of the qualified privilege is that it imperils a 
journalist’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of his sources.191  A 
terrible flaw of the qualified privilege is that it neglects the interests of a 
critical party in the newsgathering and dissemination process:  the 
confidential source.192  This stems from the fact that the qualified 
privilege classifies the identity of a reporter’s confidential source as 
confidential information, which is subject to compulsory disclosure in 
certain circumstances.193  The side effect of not granting any protection to 
confidential sources is the perpetuation of the chilling effect.194  Once the 
chilling effect is implicated, then so is the public’s interest in the 
dissemination of news and information, albeit indirectly.195  Therefore, 
the two overarching costs of the qualified privilege are that it offers 
inadequate protection for confidential sources and impinges on the free 
flow of information.196 
                                                 
190 See infra notes 191–96 (describing the two costs of the qualified privilege, which are 
that it offers minimal protection to confidential sources and limits the free flow of 
information to the public which could result in the public being less informed). 
191 See Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1601 (stating that disclosure, and even the 
possibility of disclosure, inhibits the communication of news from confidential sources to 
journalists); Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously:  Shadowy Sources, Jailed Journalists, and 
the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, supra note 33, at 1068 (stressing the 
importance of the journalistic tradition of defending a source of information who wishes to 
remain anonymous). 
192 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 102 (stating that the importance of confidential sources 
and allowing journalists to maintain their confidentiality is imperative to the 
newsgathering and dissemination process). 
193 See supra Part II.C.3.b (no qualified privilege that was surveyed has a specific 
provision protecting the ability of journalists to maintain the confidentiality of their 
sources).  For further discussion, see infra Part III.C (discussing the importance of the 
blended approach’s invocation of a separate provision into the privilege, providing for the 
confidentiality of the source). 
194 See, e.g., Laura R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources:  A Moral, Legal, and Civic 
Duty, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 573, 583 (2005) (arguing that if a journalist’s 
confidential sources are left unprotected then the newsgathering process would be chilled, 
and, subsequently, there would be a drop in the amount of news coverage because of the 
reluctance of sources to come forward and speak to reporters). 
195 E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712–15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(reasoning that the fundamental right of the press to remain free from government 
intrusion means the citizenry has a substantial right to know the information upon which 
the media reports, hence the public has a legitimate interest in the dissemination of news 
being chilled). 
196 See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text (determining that the drawbacks of the 
qualified privilege are that it offers nominal protection for confidential sources which can 
lead to the dissemination of news being chilled, and subsequently, the public’s right to 
know will be infringed). 
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The cost-benefit analysis reveals that the qualified privilege strikes 
an appropriate balance between the rights and interests of the litigants, 
the government, and the press; however, it leaves out the interests of two 
critical parties:  confidential sources and the general public.197  The 
potential threat of the chilling effect is too great a cost to justify the 
qualified privilege.198  Hence, a qualified privilege, by itself, is reasonable 
but does not yield the most practical results because it imperils the 
interests of confidential sources and the public.199 
C. The Blended Privilege:  A Model of Pragmatism 
This Section explores the blended approach that has been adopted 
by New York and the District of Columbia.200  First, this Section 
identifies the benefits created by a blended privilege.201  Next, this 
Section surveys the costs connected to the blended privilege.202  Lastly, 
this Section analyzes the costs and benefits of the blended privilege and 
concludes that the benefits vastly outweigh the costs.203 
There are two benefits of the blended privilege.204  First, the blended 
privilege completely insulates reporters from being compelled to 
disclose the identity of confidential sources, which prevents the chilling 
effect from dissuading the gathering and dissemination of news.205  
                                                 
197 See supra notes 191–96 and accompanying text (explaining that although the benefits 
of the qualified privilege are numerous, yet they are stymied by the lack of protection for 
sources which could cause the gathering and dissemination of news to be chilled). 
198 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 715 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stressing that a lack of protection 
for the media will directly impact the public’s right to know and the free flow of 
information to the public).  See Handman, supra note 194, at 585–86 (stating that the chilling 
effect is a very real possibility if the ability of journalists to protect and keep the confidence 
of sources is infringed or abrogated). 
199 See supra Part III.B (concluding from the cost-benefit analysis that even though the 
qualified privilege is more desirable than the absolute privilege, the costs of the qualified 
privilege trump the benefits). 
200 See infra Part III.C (conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the blended privilege, which 
combines portions from the absolute privilege and qualified privilege). 
201 See infra Part III.C (outlining the benefits of the blended privilege). 
202 See infra Part III.C (discussing the costs of the blended privilege). 
203 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the costs and benefits of the blended privilege and 
finding that the benefits of the blended privilege vastly prevail over the costs). 
204 See infra Part III.C (explaining that the first benefit of the blended privilege is that it 
completely insulates confidential sources, which prevents the chilling effect from 
occurring; and, secondly, the blended privilege accounts for the interests that litigants, the 
government, and the judicial system have in obtaining relevant and material evidence and 
information). 
205 E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (1999); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAWS § 79-H (McKinney 1996).  See 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726–29 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stressing the 
important role of confidential sources in the newsgathering process and reasoning that 
leaving confidential sources unprotected would chill the dissemination of news to the 
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Second, the blended approach implements a modified qualified privilege 
that gives litigants, the government, and the judicial system the 
opportunity to access material information and evidence.206  With respect 
to the first benefit of the blended privilege, and as previously noted, an 
overriding cost of the absolute privilege is that it gives too much 
deference to newsgatherers and elevates their interests above those of 
other parties, such as litigants, law enforcement, and the courts.207  A 
substantial benefit of the blended approach is that it recognizes this error 
and compensates for it by vesting newsgatherers with the ability to 
refuse to disclose the identity of a confidential source.208  In contrast to 
this approach, the qualified privilege does not grant any protection 
whatsoever to confidential sources.209  Thus, one of the blended 
approach’s primary benefits is that it gives absolute protection for 
journalists to maintain the confidentiality of sources of their 
information.210 
                                                                                                             
public).  See also Developments in the Law, supra note 35, at 1601 (iterating that the possibility 
of disclosure of a confidential source’s identity retards communications between journalists 
and sources); supra notes 138–39, 192–94  and accompanying text (explaining that the 
primary benefit of the absolute privilege is that the absolute privilege encompasses 
protection for a reporter’s confidential information, including the identity of confidential 
sources, and that the most costly flaw of the qualified privilege is that it does not grant 
enough protection to confidential sources). 
206 See D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (adopting in its reporter’s shield law a modified qualified 
privilege that requires a moving party demonstrate the information at issue is relevant to 
his case, cannot be obtained through other reasonable means, and there is an overriding 
need for disclosure of the information); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (enacting a modified 
qualified privilege that, in order for a divestment of the privilege to occur, requires a 
litigant to show the information in the reporter’s possession is highly material, critical or 
necessary to his claim, and cannot be obtained from alternative sources).  See also supra 
notes 178–80 and accompanying text (illustrating the imperative need for reporter’s shield 
laws to grant some form of qualified privilege to give those litigants and government 
agencies who legitimately need information a journalist has in his possession a chance to 
obtain the evidence). 
207 See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text (discussing the prevailing cost of the 
absolute privilege which is its impractical protection for newsgatherers and sources alone, 
and concluding that by not even considering the interests of individual litigants, the 
government, and the courts the absolute privilege, by itself is ineffective). 
208 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (incorporating an absolute privilege for journalists to 
resist compulsory disclosure of confidential sources); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (same). 
209 See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (providing a qualified privilege for a journalist’s 
confidential information, but with no express provision accommodating the interests of 
confidential sources); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (1985) (same). 
210 See supra notes 205, 208–09 and accompanying text (arguing that a significant benefit 
of the blended privilege is that it expressly accommodates the interests of confidential 
sources and provides for their absolute protection, which is necessary to ensure the 
continuous flow of news and information to the public). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss1/6
2009] Your Secret’s Safe With Me 225 
Regarding the second benefit of the blended privilege (the 
incorporation of a modified qualified privilege), a particularly 
compelling aspect of the qualified privilege is that it accounts for the 
interests that litigants, the government, and the judicial system have in 
obtaining relevant evidence and information from newsgatherers.211  The 
blended approach properly tailors the use of the qualified privilege to 
reach information that could potentially be used as evidence.212  In 
addition, the blended privilege implements an appropriate balancing test 
to determine when a reporter’s right to maintain his confidential 
information should be divested.213  Moreover, the balancing of interests 
required by the modified qualified privilege assures the interests of the 
press are not disregarded or belittled.214  Thus, the blended approach’s 
modified qualified privilege that provides for compulsory disclosure of a 
newsgatherer’s confidential or unpublished information in certain 
circumstances is necessary for a shield law to function effectively.215 
In contrast to the benefits, the sole cost of the blended privilege is 
that it prevents pure freedom of the press because a journalist could be 
compelled to disclose unpublished or confidential information if a 
movant meets his burden of proof.216  Nevertheless, acceptable 
                                                 
211 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (incorporating a modified qualified privilege that lays 
out a balance test the requirements of which a movant must satisfy before a journalist’s 
qualified privilege will be divested); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (same). 
212 See, e.g., infra note 213 and accompanying text (stating that New York and the District 
of Columbia adopted a modified qualified privilege with a balancing test to determine 
when a litigant can access or discover information or evidence a journalist has in his 
possession). 
213 See supra note 211 and accompanying text (emphasizing that a key aspect of the 
blended privilege is that it is flexible in that it grants litigants the opportunity to obtain a 
journalist’s confidential information, yet unwavering in its protection for confidential 
sources). 
214 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (requiring the litigant to show a compelling need for the 
information or evidence for discovery to be compelled); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 
(requiring the presence of  an overriding public interest); D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (although 
adopting a blended privilege, the modified qualified privilege encapsulated in the District 
of Columbia’s blended privilege requires the showing of an overriding public interest).  See 
also note 179 and accompanying text (stating that even though a qualified privilege and 
even the modified qualified privilege that is incorporated into the blended privilege give 
litigants the chance to divest a reporter’s confidential information, these litigants must 
satisfy a heavy burden of proof to compel discovery of the evidence; therefore, there exists 
a strong presumption in favor of allowing a journalist to maintain the confidentiality of 
certain information). 
215 See supra notes 211–14 and accompanying text (stating that a considerable benefit of 
the blended privilege is that it gives litigants the opportunity to discover a newsgatherer’s 
confidential information). 
216 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712–15 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stressing 
that an absolute privilege was necessary to protect reporters because it was a command of 
the First Amendment and essential to the concept of liberty under the Bill of Rights). 
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safeguards are in place that prohibit a pervasive intrusion into the 
media’s freedom.217  In all actuality, the press is still free to report 
whatever news it deems appropriate, and reporters are allowed to 
maintain the confidentiality of their sources.218  Therefore, the cost of the 
blended privilege is fairly minimal.219 
The foregoing cost-benefit analysis of the blended privilege 
illustrates that its benefits outweigh its costs.220  The blended approach 
offers absolute protection for sources and gives consideration to the 
interests of the newsgatherer, the litigant, and the government.221  Thus, 
the blended privilege provides an advantage that the other types of 
shield laws do not:  it takes into account the interests of all parties who 
could be affected by court-ordered disclosure of confidential 
information.222  The only detriment of the blended approach is that it 
takes away some of the freedom enjoyed by members of the media.223  
This is remedied, however, by the fact that the blended privilege targets 
the disclosure only of information, as opposed to sources, and gives 
substantial deference to a reporter’s autonomy by requiring litigants to 
                                                 
217 See, e.g., supra note 179 and accompanying text (emphasizing that sufficient protection 
for the interests of journalists is evidenced by the elevated burden of proof that is required 
to be met before any form of the qualified privilege is divested). 
218 See supra notes 214, 217 (noting that the only concession which journalists must make 
under the modified qualified privilege is that they may be required to disclose certain 
information in specific situations, particularly when a criminal defendant shows a 
compelling or substantially important need for the information). 
219 See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text (describing that the single cost of the 
blended privilege, which is that it slightly infringes on a reporter’s confidentiality, is only 
nominal at best). 
220 See infra notes 221–25 and accompanying text (concluding that the blended privilege 
combines the most beneficial aspects of the absolute privilege and qualified privilege, 
which, in turn, reduces the negative impact of the blended privilege). 
221 See, e.g., supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text (outlining the primary benefits of 
the blended privilege to be that it protects the interests of confidential sources while at the 
same time balancing the interests of journalists, litigants, government and law enforcement 
agencies, and the courts). 
222 See supra notes 211–15 and accompanying text (discussing how the blended privilege 
adopts the principal benefit of the qualified privilege in that it balances the rights and 
interests of the parties concerned in each particular situation) (emphasis added). 
223 See supra notes 216–18 and accompanying text (detailing the only cost of the blended 
privilege:  at times it can impair a reporter’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of 
information and evidence). 
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meet a high burden to trigger compulsory disclosure.224  Hence, the 
benefits of the blended approach clearly outweigh the costs.225 
D. Immunity:  A Unique Approach With Generic Results 
The final Section of Part III considers California’s approach of 
granting newsgatherers immunity from being held in contempt.226  This 
Section explores how California’s method is similar to the blended 
approach that has been enacted by New York and the District of 
Columbia.227  It concludes, however, that granting immunity from 
contempt is inadequate because it actually offers less protection for 
members of the media and confidential sources than the absolute 
privilege, qualified privilege, or blended privilege.228 
California’s shield law grants newsgatherers immunity from being 
held in contempt for refusing to disclose their sources and 
information.229  The California Supreme Court carved out an exception 
that allows the disclosure of a reporter’s unpublished information if the 
requirements of a balancing test are met.230  The balancing test adopted 
by the California Supreme Court examines:  “(a) Whether the 
                                                 
224 See, e.g., supra note 214 and accompanying text (explaining that even though the 
interests of journalists are diminished by the blended privilege their interests are not 
wholly disregarded due to the enhanced burdens of proof that movants must satisfy when 
trying to compel discovery of confidential information). 
225 See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text (concluding that the benefits of the 
blended privilege outweigh the costs because it incorporates the best that the absolute 
privilege and qualified privilege have to offer:  it protects confidential sources and balances 
the rights of all parties concerned to determine whether to compel disclosure). 
226 See infra Part III.D (conducting an analysis of the costs and benefits of California’s 
approach to a reporter’s shield law:  granting immunity from contempt to newsgatherers 
for refusing to comply with court-ordered disclosure or subpoenas).  
227 See infra Part III.D (noting that the theory behind California’s grant of immunity to 
journalists is comparable to the methodology of the blended privilege because immunity 
acts in a similar manner to the blended privilege’s absolute protection for confidential 
sources). 
228 See infra Part III.D (explaining that although immunity and the blended privilege are 
similar, immunity actually grants less protection to confidential sources because there is no 
express provision addressing the interests of confidential sources, and immunity does not 
proscribe other judicial sanctions from being imposed against a reporter for failure to 
comply with a subpoena). 
229 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (granting a newsgatherer immunity from being held in 
contempt for refusing to disclose any information, whether confidential or not, or the 
identity of any confidential source).  See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1993) (providing the 
same privilege); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 2001) (same). 
230 See Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 948–49 (Cal. 1990) (reasoning that 
although immunity was critical to a reporter, litigants, particularly criminal defendants and 
prosecutors, as well as law enforcement agencies should be able to obtain evidence if a 
sufficient need was demonstrated). 
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unpublished information is confidential or sensitive . . . (b) The interests 
sought to be protected by the shield law . . . (c) The importance of the 
information to the criminal defendant . . . [and] (d) Whether there is an 
alternative source for the unpublished information.”231  In essence, the 
application of California’s reporter’s shield law is similar to the blended 
approach championed by New York and the District of Columbia.232  
California’s approach is unsuitable, however, because immunity actually 
offers less protection to newsgatherers than an absolute privilege or the 
absolute provision present in the blended privilege.233  A reporter does 
not have to be held in contempt for a judge to sanction the reporter.234  
Thus, the sole cost of granting immunity to journalists is that it offers less 
protection to newsgatherers and their sources than any other privilege, 
which renders California’s approach entirely unacceptable.235 
                                                 
231 Id. at 949–50 (emphasis omitted).  See also Part III.B (discussing the benefits and costs 
of the qualified privilege, and emphasizing the equity and fairness principles advanced by 
the qualified privilege).  
232 Compare CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2, and Delaney, 789 P.2d at 949–51 (granting immunity 
from contempt and implementing a qualified privilege developed by the California 
Supreme Court), with D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (1992), and N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H 
(McKinney 1996) (granting an absolute privilege for reporter’s to keep confidential the 
identity of their sources and also providing a qualified privilege for disclosing a reporter’s 
confidential information). 
233 See New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 811, 817–18 (Cal. 1990) 
(emphasizing that just because California’s reporter’s shield law grants a journalist 
immunity does not mean that a court is forbidden from imposing other sanctions in order 
to coerce a reporter’s compliance with a subpoena or court-ordered testimony).  See also 
Rousso, supra note 108, at 353–54 (noting that California’s shield law grants immunity to 
members of the media by preventing a journalist from being prosecuted for failing to 
comply with a subpoena or court order requiring him to testify about confidential sources 
or information, but says nothing about other forms of punishment that a court could 
impose upon a journalist to compel disclosure or testimony). 
234 See New York Times, 796 P.2d 811 at 817–18 (Cal. 1984) (stating that courts possess 
forms of punishment other than simply a finding of contempt and incarceration).  See also 
Savage, supra note 41, at 8 (reporting that in response to a journalist’s refusal to comply 
with a subpoena and disclose a confidential source, a federal judge ordered the journalist to 
pay, without any help from her employer, family, or friends, a daily fine of five hundred 
dollars until she complied with the subpoena). 
235 See supra notes 229–234 and accompanying text (determining that granting 
newsgatherers immunity from being held in contempt for noncompliance with a subpoena 
is a wholly inappropriate methodology because it not only offers no protection to 
confidential sources, but it does not even adequately insulate journalists from sanctions 
other than being held in contempt or incarcerated). 
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E. Results of the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In summation, a set of principles may be drawn from the foregoing 
cost-benefit analyses.236  First, to be viable, a reporter’s shield law must 
protect confidential sources by granting newsgatherers an absolute 
privilege to maintain the confidentiality of the source’s identity.237  
Second, it is essential for a shield law to provide some form of qualified 
privilege in order to balance the rights and interests of all parties 
concerned so as to arrive at a fair and equitable result.238  Third, the 
absolute privilege and qualified privilege are inadequate models 
standing alone, but when the two are combined by the blended privilege, 
they become quite effective.239  To illustrate these principles, Part IV of 
this Note contributes an application of these findings by presenting a 
model reporter’s shield law.240 
IV.  A RESOLUTION:  THE NEWSGATHERER’S PROTECTION ACT 
This Note’s cost-benefit analysis demonstrates that the blended 
approach is the optimal privilege to be incorporated into a reporter’s 
shield law.  Thus, any reporter’s shield law that is adopted should 
include the use of a blended privilege.  Part IV of this Note contributes a 
model reporter’s shield law, entitled “The Newsgatherer’s Protection 
Act,” which implements a blended privilege and provides full 
commentary. 
                                                 
236 See infra notes 237–39 and accompanying text (drawing three overarching principles 
from the cost-benefit analysis conducted in Part III:  a reporter’s shield law must protect 
confidential sources, incorporate a form of qualified privilege to give a litigant the 
opportunity to access certain information if he has a sufficient need, and the absolute 
privilege and qualified privilege are inadequate by themselves but very effective if 
combined). 
237 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text (stressing that the primary benefit of 
the absolute privilege is that it grants comprehensive protection to confidential sources and 
is a feature that any reporter’s shield law should incorporate). 
238 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (explaining that the principle benefit of 
any form of qualified privilege is that it promotes equity and fairness to all parties 
concerned). 
239 See supra Part III.C (concluding that the blended privilege adopted by the District of 
Columbia and New York is the most effective and practical approach to reporter’s shield 
laws because it combines the most desirable aspects of the absolute privilege and the 
qualified privilege). 
240 See infra Part IV (contributing a model reporter’s shield law that incorporates the 
blended privilege). 
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A. The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act - Section 1:  Scope 
This Section is intended to define the class of persons falling 
under the protection of this Act.  Any person associated, 
employed, or regularly engaged, connected or affiliated for 
personal, pecuniary, or financial gain with a newspaper or 
media organiation that publishes or broadcasts at regular 
intervals or has a general circulation shall fall under the 
protection of this Act.241 
Commentary  
The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act incorporates a broad definition of 
newsgatherer to protect not simply the journalist, but also editors, 
photographers, administrators, researchers, fact-checkers, and other 
support staff affiliated with either print or broadcast media 
organizations.242  The broad scope of the Act includes such journalists as 
e-journalists and bloggers, as long as they are associated, employed, or 
regularly engaged, connected, or affiliated with a news or media 
organization.243  More importantly, however, by widening the scope of 
The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act, confidential sources are 
encompassed under the Act’s large umbrella of protection because they 
are “associated . . . regularly engaged, connected, or affiliated” with a 
protected organization or person.244 
                                                 
241 The proposed model statute this Note contributes, both the text and commentary, is 
the product of the author’s work and is not an adaptation of any one particular reporter’s 
shield law, but is based on the complete range of the topics discussed and analyzed by this 
Note.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (employing a broad definition of who is a journalist 
for the purposes of the state’s reporter’s shield law); IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1 (1998) (same); 
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-H (McKinney 1996) (same).  See also, supra note 91 (stating the 
Florida definition of journalist setting forth broad language to extend the shield law’s 
protection anyone who is in any way connected with a news organization); supra note 75 
(giving the Indiana definition of journalist which includes that any news or media 
organization be licensed by the state); supra note 102 (outlining the New York shield law 
which defines the terms news or media organization as opposed to a journalist). 
242 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (including a broader scope of protection the shield law to 
those who are support staff). 
243 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining that independent journalists such 
as bloggers and e-journalists are left unprotected by state reporter’s shield laws because 
they are unaffiliated with any legitimate or official news organization). 
244 The quoted material is an excerpt from Section 1 of The Newsgatherer’s Protection 
Act.  See supra Part III.A; note 237 and accompanying text (concluding from the cost-benefit 
analysis that protection for confidential sources is essential to the gathering and 
dissemination of news and information and, therefore, it is necessary for a reporter’s shield 
law to guard the interests of confidential sources). 
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B. The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act - Section 2:  Absolute Privilege for 
Sources 
Section 2 of this act is intended to grant any organization or 
individual falling under Section 1 of this Act an absolute 
privilege to keep confidential the identity of confidential 
sources.  No organization or person falling under Section 1 of 
this Act shall be compelled to disclose in any legal or 
investigatory proceeding the identity, including any 
identifying characteristic or description, of any source of news 
or information who has entered into an agreement of 
confidentiality with the organization or person falling under 
Section 1.  This absolute privilege applies whether the news or 
information obtained from the confidential source goes 
published or unpublished or whether the form of the news or 
information is given in written, verbal, recorded, 
photographic, or any other communicable form.245  
Commentary  
The purpose of Section 2 is to grant newsgatherers an absolute 
privilege to resist compulsory disclosure of the identity of any and all 
sources of information that wish for their identity to remain 
confidential.246  The intention of Section 2 is to place the decision to 
remain anonymous with the confidential source and bar a journalist 
from being forced to divulge the source’s identity because of a subpoena 
or court order.247  Thus, due to the potentially severe consequences that 
await confidential sources, The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act allows a 
                                                 
245 The proposed model statute this Note contributes, both the text and commentary, is 
the product of the author’s work and is not an adaptation of any one particular reporter’s 
shield law, but is based on the complete range of the topics discussed and analyzed by this 
Note.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (1992) (granting reporter’s an absolute privilege to 
resist compulsory disclosure of the identity of a confidential source; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 
§ 79-H (same); IND. CODE § 34-46-4-2 (1998) (same). 
246 See supra Part III.A; note 243 and accompanying text (noting the significance of 
granting newsgatherer’s an absolute privilege to maintain the confidentiality of the identity 
of sources). 
247 See Campagnolo, supra note 1, at 451–53 (stressing the extreme significance in the 
journalistic profession of protecting sources and information from discovery or revelation); 
Dicke, supra note 41, at 1565 n.64 (explaining that journalists have a professional duty to 
refrain from disclosing the identity of confidential sources and to do everything within 
their power to protect a source of information from judicial or investigating bodies).  See 
also supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the significance that a source remain 
confidential if he or she so desires as well as a journalist’s professional obligation to protect 
his source’s decision to remain confidential and anonymous). 
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confidential source to control his own fate by giving him the final 
decision as to whether his identity will remain confidential. 
C. The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act - Section 3:  Qualified Privilege for 
Information 
Section 3 of this Act grants any organization or person falling 
under Section 1 of this Act a qualified privilege to maintain 
the confidentiality of news and information acquired from 
sources.  No organization or person falling under Section 1 of 
this Act shall be compelled to disclose in any legal or 
investigatory proceeding the substance of any news or 
information, whether it goes published or unpublished, that is 
obtained from or through the cooperation of a confidential or 
non-confidential source, except as provided by subsections 1–3 
of Section 3. 
A movant may divest the qualified privilege granted to the 
organization or person falling under Section 1 of this Act if 
the movant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that: 
1) the news, information, documents, or evidence the 
newsgatherer has in his possession are relevant and 
material to the movant’s case; 
2) the news, information, documents, or evidence 
cannot be obtained through any other means, and all 
other sources of the news, information, documents, or 
evidence have been exhausted; and 
3) there exists a reasonable need for the news, 
information, documents, or evidence.248 
Commentary 
Section 3 of The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act grants those 
organizations and individuals falling under Section 1 of this Act a 
qualified privilege to maintain the confidentiality of information gained 
from sources whether that information or the source is confidential or 
non-confidential.  This Section allows a newsgatherer’s information, 
                                                 
248 The proposed model statute this Note contributes, both the text and commentary, is 
the product of the author’s work and is not an adaptation of any one particular reporter’s 
shield law, but is based on the complete range of the topics discussed and analyzed by this 
Note.  See supra text accompanying notes 91, 101 (stating that Florida’s qualified privilege 
can be overcome if a movant meets the burden of proving through clear and specific 
evidence or clear and convincing evidence that he has a compelling need for the 
information); supra note 178 (discussing the reduced burden of proof required by Illinois’ 
reporter’s shield law). 
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whether published or unpublished, to be vulnerable to compelled 
disclosure.249  The rationale behind this provision is that it gives litigants 
the opportunity to divest the qualified privilege, which is consistent with 
the principles of equity and fairness that permeate the qualified 
privilege.250  Hence, the litigants alone must satisfy the three conditions 
enumerated under Section 3.  Section 3’s qualified privilege presumes, 
however, that the newsgatherer’s information and work product are 
privileged until the conditions of Section 3 are met.251 
Commentary on Section 3, Clause (1) 
Clause 1 of Section 3 places the burden of proof on the movant and 
requires that he or she prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
news, information, documents, or evidence in the newsgatherer’s 
possession is relevant and material to the movant’s case or claim.252  The 
goal of Clause 1 is to eliminate fishing expeditions by litigants, as well as 
frivolous arguments or attempts to access news or information in a 
newsgatherer’s possession.253 
Commentary on Section 3, Clause (2) 
Clause 2 of Section 3 requires the movant to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the news, information, documents, or evidence 
that is being sought from the newsgatherer cannot be obtained from any 
other source.254  In addition, Clause 2 requires the movant to prove by 
                                                 
249 See supra note 73 and accompanying (explaining that parties in civil proceedings 
typically cannot divest a journalist’s protection from compulsory disclosure). 
250 See supra Part III.B; note 238 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the significance 
of the qualified privilege is that it allows litigants, government officials, and the judicial 
system to have access, or at the very least the possibility of access, to as much information 
as possible to be able to make not only informed decisions on legal issues, but to arrive at a 
fair and equitable result for all parties concerned). 
251 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 227 (Fla. 1998) (finding that the Florida 
reporter’s shield law gave journalists a qualified privilege that was going to apply to 
protect a reporter’s confidential information unless a movant offered sufficient evidence 
otherwise); Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 947–48 (Cal. 1990) (explaining that the 
California shield law entitled a newsgatherer to immunity from compelled disclosure 
unless the movant could show the reporter possessed exculpatory evidence). 
252 See text accompanying notes 91, 101 (describing the burden of proof Florida 
incorporates into its reporter’s shield law is a requirement that the movant introduce clear 
and convincing evidence). 
253 See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (describing how a newsgatherer is 
abused through the use of fishing expeditions conducted by litigants and law enforcement 
agencies when he is left unprotected by inadequate shield laws or no shield law at all). 
254  See text accompanying notes 91, 101 (describing the burden of proof Florida 
incorporates into its reporter’s shield law is a requirement that the movant introduce clear 
and convincing evidence). 
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clear and convincing evidence that he has exhausted all other alternative 
sources of information.255  The intent of this Section is to reduce frivolous 
claims, arguments, and attempts to obtain a newsgatherer’s privileged 
information. 
Commentary on Section 3, Clause (3) 
Clause 3 requires the movant to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that he has only a reasonable need for the news, information, 
documents, or evidence in the newsgatherer’s possession, as opposed to 
proving a compelling or overriding need.256  The clause implements the 
clear and convincing evidence burden of proof in order to allow litigants 
to have a greater opportunity to access any and all discovery material 
potentially relevant to his or her case or claim.257  To this end, Clause 3 of 
Section 3 facilitates the ability of any party, regardless of the procedural 
posture or setting of a case, to have an opportunity to access as much 
evidence as possible, which promotes an equitable and judicious result. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As a whole, The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act illustrates the value 
of the blended privilege:  it is flexible, because it allows parties to access 
information under particular conditions, but it remains concrete by 
protecting confidential sources.  The ongoing debate as to which 
privilege to incorporate into reporter’s shield laws will continue as more 
state legislatures, and perhaps even the federal government, grapple 
with either implementing a reporter’s shield law or altering existing 
shield laws.  This Note and The Newsgatherer’s Protection Act it 
contributes hope to offer guidance to legislative bodies that are 
confronted with the challenges of implementing a reporter’s shield law.  
The cost-benefit analysis conducted by this Note demonstrates that the 
blended privilege is the most practical and effective privilege to 
implement in a reporter’s shield law.  The key facet of the blended 
privilege that makes it preferable is its flexible rigidity; meaning, that the 
blended privilege’s absolute protection for confidential sources and 
balancing test for compulsory disclosure of information is an ideal 
                                                 
255 See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (stressing the need for a qualified 
privilege in order to facilitate the equitable administration of justice).  
256 See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-907 (1985) (applying a more manageable burden of proof 
that only requires the movant to demonstrate the information sought is unavailable from 
other means, relevant to his claim, and not privileged information as a state secret, which 
allows the shield law to play a greater role in both criminal and civil proceedings).  
257 See text accompanying notes 91, 101 (discussing Florida’s requirement of only the 
introduction of clear and convincing evidence). 
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framework for a reporter’s shield law.  Therefore, the blended privilege’s 
breadth and clarity allow it to appeal to newsgatherers, litigants, law 
enforcement, judges, confidential sources, and the public at large.  As 
this Note has shown, the best way for state legislatures to cash-in on 
Branzburg’s “blank check” is to take advantage of the blended privilege. 
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